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Historically, response to catastrophic events has failed to reestablish communications 
rapidly, resulting in an extension of the chaotic response phase. Communication is not 
simply a support service but an independent strategic imperative within the crisis 
response system. Current domestic crisis management acknowledges that a 
communications system is indispensable yet continues to prioritize and utilize 
communications as a support function. This thesis considers the centrality of the 
communications system binding complex emerging systems.  
The goal for crisis response is also to stabilize disrupted and interrelated systems 
that define a modern society. A communications system is the key element that allows 
systems to self-organize, adapt, and exert control over the chaos. Defining the role of 
communications requires an understanding of complexity, chaos, systems, and network 
evolution. There is a need to change crisis response organizations to reflect a modern 
understanding of the changing technical environment, and the foundational function 
communications serves in linking dynamic complex systems. This thesis also identifies 
the forces unleashed in the aftermath of a catastrophic event and illustrates how the rapid 
restoration of communications is required for successful crisis response.  
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................................................1 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................2 
C. BENEFITS OF STUDY ...................................................................................3 
D. HYPOTHESIS..................................................................................................3 
E. SCOPE ..............................................................................................................4 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................7 
A. DISASTERS AND CATASTROPHE ..........................................................10 
1. What is a Disaster? ............................................................................10 
2. Catastrophe Criteria ..........................................................................11 
3. Catastrophic Response Cycle ............................................................12 
B. CHAOS AND COMPLEXITY .....................................................................14 
C. CHAOS ...........................................................................................................18 
D. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS .............................................................................22 
1. Systems Theory ..................................................................................22 
2. Social Theory ......................................................................................24 
3. Network Theory .................................................................................26 
E. EMERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE .....................................................31 
F. INFORMATION REVOLUTION ...............................................................37 
G. DISASTER RESPONSE MODELS .............................................................38 
H. HASTILY FORMED NETWORKS ............................................................41 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................................................45 
IV. HURRICANE KATRINA .........................................................................................49 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................49 
B. IMPACT .........................................................................................................50 
C. CONTEXT ......................................................................................................52 
D. DISCONNECTION .......................................................................................53 
1. Hastily Formed Network Group—Katrina .....................................57 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................59 
V. HAITI CASE STUDY................................................................................................61 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................61 
B. THE CHALLENGES TO ITC IN HUMANITARIAN AID AND 
DISASTER RESPONSE ...............................................................................63 
C. EXISTING SYSTEM.....................................................................................64 
D. HASTILY FORMED NETWORK GROUP—HAITI ...............................67 
VI. RESPONSE NETWORK ANALYSIS .....................................................................71 
A. NETWORK ANALYSIS ...............................................................................71 
1. Katrina Response Network Data ......................................................71 
2. Katrina Response Network ...............................................................72 
B. KATRINA ORGANIZATIONS ...................................................................73 
 viii 
C. NETWORK DISCONNECTION .................................................................75 
D. NETWORK FRAGMENTATION ...............................................................76 
E. CENTRALITY—DEGREE, CLOSENESS, BETWEENNESS ................78 
F. CLOSENESS AND BETWEENNESS .........................................................82 
G. GIANT COMPONENT .................................................................................84 
H. HAITI NETWORK ANALYSIS ..................................................................86 
I. HAITI ORGANIZATIONS ..........................................................................88 
J. NETWORK DISCONNECTED ...................................................................88 
K. NETWORK FRAGMENTATION ...............................................................90 
L. CENTRALITY ...............................................................................................91 
M. NATIONAL RESPONSE AND COMMUNICATIONS ............................93 
VII. FINDINGS ................................................................................................................101 
VIII. RECOMMENDATION ...........................................................................................105 
A. COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY .........................................................105 
B. RAPID TECHNOLOGY AND ASSESSMENT TEAMS ........................106 
C. ICS RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................................106 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH ................................................................................109 
IX. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................111 
APPENDIX A.  KATRINA NETWORK DATA ..............................................................115 
APPENDIX B.  HAITI NETWORK DATA ......................................................................133 
APPENDIX C.  GLOSSARY OF NETWORK TERMS ..................................................157 
APPENDIX D.  ICS 205 INCIDENT RADIO COMMUNICATIONS PLAN ...............161 
APPENDIX E. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK ANNEXES AND 
INCIDENT COMMAND STRUCTURES 2004, 2008 & 2013. ...........................165 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................183 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................195 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Towards a Root Definition of Catastrophe and Communications .....................9 
Figure 2. Stages of Crisis Response Organizational Size Versus Time ..........................13 
Figure 3. Complexity Sciences ........................................................................................17 
Figure 4. Normal and Power Law Distribution ...............................................................28 
Figure 5. Small-world, Scale-free and Random Networks .............................................29 
Figure 6. HFN Katrina Network Node Locations, September 20, 2005 .........................59 
Figure 7. Crisis Response Data Flow Diagram ...............................................................64 
Figure 8. HFN—Haitian Network Map ..........................................................................69 
Figure 9. Diagram of Network Interaction Hurricane Katrina August 27 to 
September 19, 2005 .........................................................................................76 
Figure 10. Hurricane Katrina: Network Fragmentation August 24 to September 5, 
2005 (2012 Dataset) .........................................................................................77 
Figure 11. Hurricane Katrina: Non-Isolate Components August 24 to September 5, 
2005 (2012 Dataset) .........................................................................................78 
Figure 12. Hurricane Katrina Average Degree Centrality August 24 to September 5, 
2005 (2012 Dataset) .........................................................................................80 
Figure 13. Hurricane Katrina Hub Formation ...................................................................85 
Figure 14. Earthquake in Haiti—Static Network ..............................................................89 
Figure 15. UCINet Network Map Key for Node Colors and Shapes ................................89 
Figure 16. Network Fragmentation, Dynamic Network....................................................90 
Figure 17. Most Central Organizations, Static Network ...................................................93 
Figure 18. FEMA Incident Management Handbook—Organizational Chart ...................95 
Figure 19. FEMA Interim ICS Handbook (expires January 1, 2010)—Disaster 
Emergency Communications Branch ..............................................................96 
Figure 20. FEMA—ICS Handbook.................................................................................108 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment ..........................................................51 
Table 2.  Hurricane Katrina Participating Agencies .......................................................74 
Table 3.  Hurricane Katrina Participating Agencies—Local Agencies ..........................75 
Table 4.  Hurricane Katrina Mean Degree Centrality and Network Centralization .......79 
Table 5.  Organizations’ Highest Degree Centrality .......................................................81 
Table 6.  Ten Highest Central Degree Organizations .....................................................82 
Table 7.  Distributions of Organizations Participating in the Haiti Response ................88 
Table 8.  Network Centralization Descriptive Statistics .................................................92 
Table 9.  Small World Network within the Haiti Response System, January 12–




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAP  after action report 
API  Application Programming Interfaces 
APAN  All Partners Access Network 
CANA  Caribbean News Online 
CIA  Catastrophic Incident Annex 
CERT  Community Response Teams 
COML  communications unit leader 
COP  common operating picture 
DART  Disaster Assistance Response Team 
DEC  disaster emergency communications 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DMAT disaster medical assistance teams 
DMORT disaster mortuary teams 
DOD  Department of Defense 
EOC  Emergency Operations Center 
ESF  Emergency Function Annex 
ETC  Emergency Telecommunication Cluster 
FCO  federal coordinating officer 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FITTEST Fast IT and Telecommunication Emergency and Support Team 
HA/DR humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
HFN   hastily formed networks 
HSPD  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
IAP  incident action plan 
IASC  Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
IC  incident commander 
ICS  Incident Command System 
ICT  information and communications technologies 
 xiv 
IMAT  incident management assessment teams  
IP  Internet Protocol 
IRC  International Red Cross 
JFMCC Joint Forces Maritime Component Command 
JTF  joint task force 
MEMA Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 
MERS  Mobile Emergency Response Support 
NAVO  Naval Oceanography Center 
NLE  national level exercise 
NGO  nongovernmental organizations 
NIMS  National Incident Management System 
NPS  Naval Postgraduate School 
NRF  National Response Framework 
NRP  National Response Plan 
NECP  National Emergency Communications Plan 
OASD-NII Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Networks and Information 
Integration 
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
PAHO  Pan American Health Organization 
PFO  principal field officer 
PoLO  pockets of local order 
RECCWG Regional Emergency Communication Coordination Working Group 
RTAT  rapid telecommunications and technology teams 
SA  situational awareness 
SATCOM satellite communications 
SME  subject matter experts 
SNA  social network analysis 
UN  United Nations 
UNICEF UN Children’s Rights and Emergency Relief Organization 
UNWASH UN Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Cluster 
 xv 
U.S.  United States 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
V&TC  Volunteer and Technical Community 
WFP  World Food Programme 
WiFi  wireless fidelity 










Modern society is a complex system dependent on a multitude of interrelated sub-
systems. A catastrophic event disrupts and disconnects the socio-technical systems that 
bind society. This disruption unleashes a massive complex response, which requires the 
rapid restoration of communications in order to return stability. Historically, crisis 
response has consistently lacked a comprehensive communications strategy. An effective 
communications strategy must: (i) address complexity; (ii) identify the role 
communications serves as a mechanism to control chaos; (iii) foster self-organization; 
(iv) integrate the social forces that emerge and converge during a catastrophic event; and 
(v) manage network evolution and the expected deluge of data.  
A disrupted social state is a system in chaos. The catastrophic event also creates 
cascading disruptions to the interrelated systems that make up a modern society. Chaos 
implies a widely bounded nonlinearity within a system; relationships within the social 
systems are dynamic and disproportionate. This thesis identifies how a catastrophic event 
is a disruption of the social system. The goal of crisis response is to control the chaotic 
state and return the social system to stability. Response forces can utilize two methods to 
control chaotic states: perturbations and alteration of orbits. Perturbation uses the 
sensitivity of chaotic states to small changes that create nonlinear results.1 Altering orbits 
is a method that is used to control chaos by carefully identifying changes in a system to 
identify attractors.2 Both these methods are heavily reliant on communications and 
application of complex systems sciences.  
The use of small information and communications technology (ICT) teams is an 
example of controlling chaos through perturbations. The teams are responsible for ICT 
reconnaissance, delivering trusted situational data and quickly starting the process of 
                                                 
1 L. Douglas Kiel, Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A New Paradigm for Managing 
Change, Innovation and Organizational Renewal (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Klein, 1994).  
2 William L Ditto, and Louis M. Pecora, “Mastering Chaos,” Scientific American 269, no. 2 (August 
1993): 78–84; L. Douglas Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management: Lessons for Managing 
Periods of Extreme Instability,” in What Disaster Response Management Can Learn from Chaos Theory, 
California Emergency Medical Services Authority–Conference Proceeding, ed. Gus Koehler, May 1995, 
https://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/96/05/over_12.html  
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implementing a communications network. Peter Denning3 of the Naval Postgraduate 
School, developed the concept of hastily formed networks (HFN). These concepts utilize 
a systems approach to restore communications rapidly in the immediate aftermath of a 
catastrophic event. The concept acknowledges that the communications system relies on 
technical and social systems. The emphasis is an independent effort that applies advanced 
technology to link the affected communities and assist the converging response efforts. 
The Naval Postgraduate School’s Hastily Formed Network Group has deployed and 
field-tested these concepts with success. The experiences from these deployments led 
Brian Steckler (the director of this group) to propose the creation of rapid technology 
assessment teams (RTAT). Similar teams were used effectively (albeit unofficially) by 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during Hurricane Sandy.4 These 
teams are the perturbations necessary to begin the process of reestablishing a network.  
Small ICT teams start the process of linking the isolated communities, creating 
and expanding network connectivity. According to network theory, this rapidly created 
and growing network will naturally create hubs as it evolves. Hubs are actors that have 
the greatest number of links within a network. The case study analysis presented in this 
thesis demonstrates that the response networks grow and follow the principles of network 
theory. However, a common problem is that the networks are highly fragmented, and 
there is little successful engagement of the affected communities and emergent groups. 
The data strongly suggests that network evolution is not currently well-managed and that 
this process is shaped significantly by an organization’s ICT capabilities. By restoring 
connectivity the resulting network must be carefully managed, or the result will continue 
to be structurally unsound networks that are unable to successfully share information or 
coordinate activity.  
Formation of hubs is a method of controlling chaos through alteration of orbits. 
The hubs serve as both geographical and virtual basins of attraction during the response 
phase. Geographical hubs are natural centers for organizing and require support of greater 
                                                 
3 Peter J. Denning, “Hastily Formed Networks,” Communications of the ACM 49, no. 4 (2006): 15–20.  
4 Sean C. Kielty, and John MacLean, “We Know You Can Hear Us: The Model Emergency 
Communications Response to Super Storm Sandy” (unpublished, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2014).  
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access to connectivity and overall network management. The formation of these hubs as 
basins of attraction serves to differentiate events into smaller manageable events. These 
geographic hubs within the affected zones promote pocket of local order.5 Virtual hubs 
are the portals by which converging organizations operate outside the affected zone. 
These portals can connect utilizing undamaged access to advanced information and 
communications technology.  
Catastrophe releases massive emergent and convergent social forces. The 
emergent forces respond from within the affected population. The convergent forces are 
the external response to the event. Emergent forces are constantly at work within every 
active system. In a disordered social system, emergence is the resulting complex behavior 
and relationships of individuals and groups. The disorder creates an urgent, powerful, and 
naturally occurring (emergent) impulse to self-organize. This naturally occurring 
phenomenon is an integral part of complex systems. The affected communities in a 
catastrophe are part of a complex social system that will self-organize. The limits to this 
drive to self-organize are communications. Without access to ICT, the organization 
would be reduced to the span of the spoken word. These emergent groups would be 
isolated and unable to coordinate crisis response effectively. The emergent groups 
represent a massive potential within crisis response and have historically been the most 
effective force in a successful response. The national response has acknowledged in the 
National Response Framework (NRF)6 that successful crisis response requires the effort 
of the “whole community.” 
Convergent forces are the social system’s response from outside the affected 
regions (i.e., the organized governmental or international agencies, efforts by private 
industry and volunteer groups). The convergent forces are the labor, resources, and 
information from outside directed toward the affected regions. The convergent forces are 
                                                 
5 Eva Törnqvist, Johan Sigholm, and Simin Nadjm-Tehrani, “Hastily Formed Networks for Disaster 
Response: Technical Heterogeneity and Virtual Pockets of Local Order,” in Proceedings of the 6th 
International ISCRAM Conference, ed. Jonas Landgren, Urban Nulden, and Bartel Van de Walle, May 
2009, http://www.iscramlive.org/ISCRAM2009/papers/Contributions/
228_Technical%20and%20Cultural%20Heterogeneity%20in%20Hastily_Sigholm2009.pdf   
6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013), http://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-resource-library  
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in the best position to effect rapid restoration of communications with resources, trained 
personnel, and organized response.  
The goal of crisis response is to restore order quickly to the socio-technical 
systems to decrease human suffering and to limit economic loss. The most crucial 
component is the rapid restoration of a communications system that integrates those 
emergent and convergent forces.  
An early intervention to restore communications must address the concept that a 
communications system is a complex system that is the foundation for social self-
organization. This intervention is a primary strategic objective. Communications systems 
must address both the technical and social systems that have been disrupted. It is vital to 
understand that this is a system of systems. Catastrophes severe the links that bind the 
social systems and the technical systems. The most effective way to reestablish stability 
and promote recovery is to rebuild the links, understand the dynamics of network growth 
and behavior and prepare to manage the avalanche of inflowing data. 
Catastrophic events are fortunately rare, which limits the data sets. The two case 
studies illustrate how the U.S. and the United Nations each have responded to a 
catastrophe and the consequences of the failure to implement a comprehensive 
communications strategy. The case studies were selected based on environmental factors 
and access to modern ICT. The contrasting organizational management and the consistent 
failure to rapidly restore a communications system indicate an underlying problem 
applying ICT in modern crisis response. The NPS HFN group responded to both events 
and demonstrated that a small, technically adept team in an extreme environment can 
rapidly restore communications. The data from these two events illustrate common 
problems. The crisis response forces fail to link the affected communities quickly and 
also fail to create a functional communications system. The connection of the emergent 
and convergent forces using advanced ICT is the first step to creating a communications 
system. 
 xxi 
In the U.S., the current crisis response management and organizational model is 
described in the National Response Framework (NRF)7 and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).8 NIMS is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
organizational and management guide that governs the participation of all levels of 
government, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities for all hazard 
events. Incident Command System (ICS) is the basis for organizing. ICS is a hierarchical 
command network model designed in the 1970s by firefighters in California. This system 
has not been significantly updated or reorganized in its 40 years of service even though 
the world has experienced a technical revolution that has created far greater 
interconnection and complexity. Currently, NIMS and ICS communications and 
information management support operations, planning, logistical, and administrative 
concerns. The communications and information efforts are fragmented and spread out 
within NRF and ICS organization. This implementation of communications does not 
reflect holistic systems approach. A review of the response literature has found that: 
• Communications do not have a leadership role within the ICS command 
structure (with the exception of the public information officer).  
• Communication efforts are fragmented. 
• Communications strategy requires strategic objectives that are 
independent of other response goals. 
• Rapid restoration of a communications system is not a primary strategic 
goal in the official response literature. 
• The crisis response efforts continue to overlook this problem. For 
example, the National Level Exercise in 2011 largely ignored the role of 
communications. 
Advances in technology have been key to the emerging scientific study of 
complexity. This research examines relationships among components of a system and 
how those relationships and interactions collectively behave. Social, communication, 
technology, infrastructure are all complex systems that exist in nonlinear environments. 
Any approach to a comprehensive communications strategy must be understood through 
                                                 
7 Ibid.   
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008), accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/
nims/NIMS_core.pdf  
 xxii 
this lens. Society requires communications.9 A catastrophic event disorders society and 
the social system. The ability to self-organize and restore order requires communications.  
As the memories of Hurricane Katrina fade, the impetus for improvement in crisis 
response withers. The weakening resolve is a natural cycle with respect to policy-making. 
Currently, national response plans lack a coherent and comprehensive communications 
strategy. Divided responsibilities fragment communications efforts. Despite being 
highlighted in the National Response Framework (NRF),10 the fundamental need for 
communications has not been incorporated in changes to the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) or Incident Command System (ICS). Crisis management 
professionals must understand the central role of information and communications 
technology (ICT) and recognize the primary strategic objective of rapid restoration of a 
communications system. Mastery of these concepts is essential in order for crisis 





                                                 
9 Louise K. Comfort, “Self-Organization in Complex Systems,” Journal of Public Administration 
Research & Theory 4, no. 3 (1994): 393–410; Niklas Luhmann, “Systemtheorie, Evolutionstheorie und 
Kommunikationstheorie [System Theory, Evolution Theory, and Communication Theory],” in: 
Soziologische Aufklärung 2 [The Differentiation of Society], trans. Stephen Holmes and Charles (Opladen, 
Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag), 193–203.   
10 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework.  
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Catastrophic events create massive social, technical, and environmental disorder. 
These events are accompanied by cascading failures of critical infrastructure (particularly 
communications). The initial disaster response environment is chaos. Responses to 
catastrophes, such as Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Haiti, have demonstrated a 
widespread failure to address critical information and communication technology (ICT) 
needs. It is critical for the crisis response community to view ICT as a primary strategic 
objective that is both independent and interrelated with all facets of response. Any ICT 
solution must contemplate the problems holistically, that disruption of systems represents 
severing of the linkages that network a modern complex technical reliant society. The 
disruption is defined as chaos. In this chaos, social forces are forces released that emerge 
or converge. These forces represent the social response to a catastrophic event. The 
effectiveness is bounded by the communication linkage and information sharing systems. 
The overall goal is to control the chaos, the most effective means require effective 
communication. Furthermore, a satisfactory solution must also take into account the 
many ways chaos and complexity affect collaboration and cooperation. It must also 
consider that emergent and convergent forces require some mechanism to integrate them 
effectively. The goal is a rapidly distributed response focused on reestablishing network 
connectivity and creating functioning communications systems. These problems require 
new and innovative technical and social solutions.  
What is the most central factor contributing to failures in catastrophic responses? 
How can the national crisis response be improved? These questions are profoundly broad. 
The contention of this thesis is that a primary objective of crisis response must be the 
rapid reestablishment of communications.  
The systems and forces involved in crisis response revolve around chaos, 
complexity, self-organization, and emergence and convergence. Without communication, 
 2 
chaos is extended at the expense of self-organization. Emergent and convergent forces 
must network or risk behaving in an isolated and uncoordinated manner.  
How can communications be reestablished within the environment complex 
catastrophic crisis response? This thesis aims to answer these questions by (i) examining 
how communications systems are understood in crisis response systems and how failures 
in communication are common in crisis response; (ii) identifying the forces at work and 
the impact of communication failure; and (iii) proposing possible solutions for improving 
future response. It is essential to examine common needs and problems during the 
response stage of humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR). A catastrophic 
event is initially chaotic and entails massive complexity. There is a primal social need to 
create or restore social order from chaos; the most vital tool is communication. Without 
it, the chaotic phase would extend, and response would be uncoordinated.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The loss of communication inhibits leadership from exerting command and 
control and also leaves responders with a murky common operating picture.1 The 
response performance degrades resulting in an increase in humanitarian suffering and 
economic losses. At the same time, isolated communities cannot self-organize effectively 
or integrate with the responding forces. Past catastrophic events have demonstrated that 
the communications system is a vital component of an effective response; communication 
failure is almost certain to thwart a successful operation. The crisis response community 
must carefully address this problem, examine new processes, update response plans and 
organizational models, and adjust budgets while investigating technical solutions. This 
thesis considers the gap in communications during the response phase and examines 
solutions to address this elusive and critical problem. Ineffective response has a heavy 
cost in humanitarian and financial terms, and so there is a serious need to improve the 
communications response. Potential solutions will further the discussion of this essential 
component of disaster response. 
                                                 
1 Lynn E. Davis, Jill Rough, Gary Cecchine, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, and Laurinda L. Zeman, 
Hurricane Katrina Lessons for Army Planning and Operations (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 
38.   
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C. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This thesis examines the environmental and social challenges of crisis 
communications. The case study analysis compares common and unique problems within 
the context of a catastrophic event. Though the majority of this study is focused upon the 
subdivisions of the response phase of disaster management, the objective is to effect 
change in planning and organization. As Quarantelli states, this type of research should 
“provide a sense of how the world actually works.”2  
The objective of this study is to bridge the gap between academic research and 
disaster response practitioners. The aim is to fuse academic research with practitioner 
experience, and this research is pursued with future disasters in mind. The acceleration of 
the technical environment is a variable that presents both opportunity and obstacles for 
crisis response. Planning and management often react to past disasters to drive policy 
changes, but reaction does not account for rapid technical advances.3 As the technical 
landscape changes, traditional response doctrines need to be challenged. The theme of the 
primacy of communications in crisis response will further the debate on the policies and 
organizational principals for future crisis management decisions. The ultimate goal is to 
improve crisis response by addressing this historically complex and difficult problem. 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
The data from historic crisis response demonstrates a continual failure to 
reestablish communication quickly. The continual failure either represents a reality that is 
unsolvable or some new solution needs to be pursued. In other words, communication 
will be restored in a methodical and gradual manner or that communications has not been 
properly understood in the context of complexity and chaos. The primary response 
management and organizational models do not make communications a primary strategic 
objective. Research demonstrates that crisis response planning has continually 
underestimated the essential nature or the resources required to reestablish 
                                                 
2 Enrico L. Quarantelli, “Converting Disaster Scholarship into Effective Disaster Planning and 
Managing: Possibilities and Limitations,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 11, no. 
1 (1993): 21.    
3 Ibid., 31–35.  
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communications. The data points to a gap in response planning: a lack of a 
communications strategy. An effective communications strategy must: (i) address 
complexity; (ii) identify the role communications serve as a mechanism to control chaos; 
(iii) foster self-organization; (iv) integrate the social forces that emerge and converge 
during a catastrophic event; and (v) manage network evolution and the expected deluge 
of data.  
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) group is 
experimental information and communications technology (ICT) team that has deployed 
to the most extreme HA/DRs. These small teams have continually reestablished 
information and communications networks in the affected zones. The data from these 
deployments represents a model of how communications can be reestablished in extreme 
conditions. This model provides a practical and tested approach to rapid communications 
restoration. 
Crisis response requires organizational change. Information and communications 
need to be an objective unto themselves. Currently, the role of communications in 
domestic response is support. Also currently, within the National Response Framework 
(NRF), communications and information management support operations, planning, 
logistical, and administrative concerns.4 The communications and information efforts are 
fragmented and spread out within NRF and in Incident Management System (ICS) 
organization. Any change should aim to consolidate information and communications 
and provide sufficient leadership influence to pursue independent strategic objectives. 
E. SCOPE 
The objective of this thesis is to create the proper context to define the concepts 
and theories that describe the context and how they relate to primacy of communications 
in a complex catastrophic crisis response. Defining catastrophe requires a definition that 
sets clear boundaries. This definition is a source of vigorous debate in disaster research; 
however, a clear definition creates the canvas upon which the concepts and theories of 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013) http://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-resource-library  
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chaos and complexity can be explored. For the purposes of this thesis, a catastrophe is 
defined as a massive disruption to the interconnected modern socio-technical systems. 
The links and relationships of these systems have been severed. Any formulation of a 
communication strategy requires an understanding of systems theory; the role 
communication plays in social self-organization and the manner emerging networks 
evolve.  
The primary focus is domestic crisis response. The thesis assumes any 
catastrophic event will require assistance from the federal government. The objective of 
this thesis is to demonstrate the central role of communications and the gaps found in the 
National Response Framework (NRF).5 The NRF represents the guide and organizational 
basis for national response to disasters and emergencies. The framework includes the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS), and 
the supporting annexes.  
This thesis uses data from two case studies: Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake 
in Haiti. The objective of this research is to demonstrate how communications were 
mishandled during Hurricane Katrina and how subsequent revisions have continued this 
mishandling. The earthquake in Haiti serves two purposes. First, it illustrates the affect 
communications failures have on crisis response, and second, the international crisis 
response system provides a management contrast with a common outcome. The 
earthquake in Haiti occurred five years after Katrina. This short span of time reveals the 
speed of change of the technical landscape and the new challenges for crisis response. 
The NPS HFN group responded to both events, and its deployments represent a 
demonstration of small technical teams successfully reestablishing local ICT links.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to cover certain aspects of communications 
and crisis response, such as:  
• public messaging 
• media 
• civilian-military  
                                                 
5 Ibid.   
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• private-public partnerships 
• volunteer and technical communities 
The interaction of these essential components presents crisis responders with benefits, 
challenges, and obstacles that are beyond the scope of this paper. One can conclude that 
there is greater need to develop a comprehensive communications strategy for future 
crisis response. Greater interconnectivity, greater data flows, and greater complexity 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review assesses research and concepts that define the environment 
(catastrophic event); the concepts and theories that describe response behavior (chaos, 
complexity); how complex systems are interrelated; the social forces released (emergence 
and convergence); U.S. and United Nations (UN) response framework; and hastily 
formed networks. The environmental state of the problem requires a clear definition (see 
Figure 1). The environmental state of the problem requires a clear definition, and to that 
end, the literature review will consider several definitions for catastrophe. The goal of 
responders is a swift transition from the initial chaos to a more stable state. 
Communication is the foundational complex system that binds and integrates the 
interrelated systems. The loss of communication severely inhibits effective relief.  
Complexity and systems are a central theme of this thesis. A catastrophic event 
releases powerful social forces. Emergent forces respond from within the affected 
communities, and convergent forces respond from the outside. The forces involved 
reflect the relationships of chaos and complex systems, the interdependence of emergent 
and convergent forces, and the role communication plays. The nature of a catastrophe 
must be understood to frame the relationships that the forces release. The concept that a 
catastrophic event is a social event compressed in social time defines the relationship to 
social, systems, and network theory to the processes of communication. During a 
catastrophe, communities are devastated, and the need for aid releases convergent and 
emergent forces that must be bound by technical and social networks. The literature 
examines communication systems during catastrophic events from the perspective of 
failures and the effect on the extended chaos of the response phase.  
The responses to Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Haiti reflect two 
disaster management styles with different organizations that were operating in different 
periods of the technical revolution and with different approaches to implementing a 
communications strategy. They both failed. The common response shortcoming was the 
inability to establish effective communication. These failures point to a misunderstanding 
of communications and the role of information and communication technology. The 
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focus of this research is the response phase, but the recommendations need to be 






Figure 1.  Towards a Root Definition of Catastrophe and Communications16 
                                                 
16 Figure based on concept from: Denis Smith, “In the Eyes of the Beholder? Making Sense of the System(s) of Disaster,” in, What is a Disaster? New 
Answers to Old Questions, ed. Ronald W. Perry, and Enrico L. Quarantelli (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2005), 225.   
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A. DISASTERS AND CATASTROPHE 
What is a disaster and why is it important to describe clearly? It would seem like a 
relatively easy word to define; however, it is crucial to understand the environment of the 
given disaster. The University of Delaware Disaster Research Center has led the effort to 
define this term not as a mechanism but as a social event. So why is terminology 
important: what is the concept? This is more than an ontological exercise: it is the 
creation and bounding of a framework. It explains the distinguishing characteristics of 
how a phenomenon operates and what factors cause it to operate. It begins the process of 
making predictions and “forms the knowledge upon” actions taken to control the event.17  
1. What is a Disaster? 
A useful definition of a disaster for our purposes must describe a complex abstract 
problem, frame the environment in concrete terms, remove ambiguity from concepts, and 
clarify the essential goals. The challenge is to create an understanding that includes the 
type of definition, purpose, and audience as well as devising a definition that recognizes 
the need to separate conditions, characteristics, and consequences.18 There were 32,367 
automobile-related fatalities in 2011. This is a tragic and enormous loss of life, but it is 
not a disaster because it is not concentrated in time and space.19  
Disaster research normally relies upon an implicit definition: an event that 
happens in a concentrated time with some negative impact on some social entity that is 
disruptive to generally accepted social life.20 The National Response Framework defines 
                                                 
17 Ronald. W. Perry, “Disasters, Definitions and Theory Construction,” in What is a Disaster? ed. 
Ronald W. Perry and Enrico L. Quarantelli (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2005), 321.      
18 Enrico L. Quarantelli, “A Social Science Research Agenda for the Disasters of the 21st Century,” in 
What is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions, ed. Ronald W. Perry, and Enrico L. Quarantelli (325–
396) (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2005), 333.  
19 U.S. Department of Transportation, “New NHTSA Analysis Shows 2011 Traffic Fatalities Declined 
by Nearly Two Percent” (NHTSA 47–12), press release, December 10, 2012, http://www.nhtsa.gov/
About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2012/
New+NHTSA+Analysis+Shows+2011+Traffic+Fatalities+Declined+by+Nearly+Two+Percent  
Charles Fritz, “Disasters,” in Contemporary Social Problems, ed. Robert Merton and Robert Nisbet 
(651–694) (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961).  
20 Ibid.   
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disaster as politically mandated.21 A mandated definition has politically meaning, but it 
doesn’t express the complexity of the phenomenon. 
The University of Delaware Disaster Research Center has expended significant 
effort to attempt to reach consensus among disaster researchers about the most common 
definition is a social event in social time.22 A disaster is a disruption of the social system 
and the interconnected subsystems that define a modern society. 
2. Catastrophe Criteria 
The federal government recognizes that some catastrophic disaster events need to 
be specially categorized. The National Response Framework acknowledges that 
catastrophic incidents involve more stakeholders and require more resources and greater 
response.23 The effort to classify events that have greater scope and complexity that are 
different than the challenges of a “simple” disaster is well documented.24 The criteria 
used in this thesis were developed by E. L. Quarantelli and clearly defined the differences 
in “Catastrophes are Different from Disasters: Some Implications for Crisis.”  
• “Most or all of the community-built environment is heavily impacted.”  
• “Local officials are unable to undertake their usual work role, and this 
often extends into the recovery period.” Many leadership roles may have 
to be taken by outsiders to the community.  
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework.  
22 According to “Sorokin and Merton… physically based time-reckoning inexorably marches on in 
relatively homogeneous units, while social time unfolds with varying rhythms; sometimes rapidly, 
sometimes slowly, and sometimes with breaks (e.g., sleep or holidays). J. David Lewis, and Andrew J. 
Weigert, “The Structures and Meanings of Social Time,” special issue, Social Forces 60, no. 2 (1981): 
432–462; Fritz, “Disasters;” Perry, “Disasters, Definitions and Theory Construction,” 315; Gary A. Kreps, 
“Future Directions in Disaster Research,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 7, no. 
3 (1989): 215–241;Samuel Henry Prince, Catastrophe and Social Change, Based upon a Sociological 
Study of the Halifax Disaster (New York: Columbia University, 1920). 
23 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework.  
24 Enrico L. Quarantelli, “Catastrophes are Different from Disasters: Some Implications for Crisis 
Planning and Managing Drawn from Katrina,” Social Science Research Council, June 11, 2006, accessed 
June 1, 2014, http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Quarantelli/; Ira Helsloot et al., eds., Mega-crises: 
Understanding the Prospects, Nature, Characteristics, and the Effects of Cataclysmic Events (Springfield, 
IL: Charles C Thomas, 2012); Civil Support: Actions are Needed to Improve DOD’s Planning for a 
Complex Catastrophe (GAO-13-763) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2013), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658406.pdf; Arnold M. Howitt, and Herman B. Leonard, “Beyond Katrina: 
Improving Disaster Response Capabilities” (PB-2006-2), Taubman Center Policy Briefs, 2006, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/70205/1253630/version/1/file/katrina_final.pdf, 18–25  
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• “Help from nearby communities cannot be provided.”  
• “Most, if not all, of the everyday community functions are sharply and 
concurrently interrupted.”  
• “The mass media system constructs catastrophes even more than they do 
disasters.”  
• “The political arena becomes even more important… National government 
and very top officials become involved.”25  
3. Catastrophic Response Cycle  
The disaster management cycle is an effort to organize and explain phenomena. 
The four phases are defined: (1) mitigation, (2) preparedness, (3) response, and (4) 
recovery.26 In “Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response,” 
John R. Harrald has subdivided the response phase in complex catastrophic events; this 
differentiates and illustrates the dynamic changes to objectives and functions through 
time (see Figure 2).27 The initial response (reaction and mobilization) reflects the chaos 
of the event and the emergent forces that begin to self-organize in reaction while 
convergent forces are mobilizing to respond. The organizational integration phase brings 
emergent and convergent forces together. This phase requires these forces to evolve into 
functioning organizations that identify needs and provide services. The integration and 
the efficiency of these groups are tied to the capabilities of the communication systems 
that support them. The convergent groups provide resources and services that are beyond 
the capacity of the emergent groups. Success in these two phases leads to a production 
phase: “the response organization is fully productive, delivering needed services as a 
matter of routine.”28 The final phase is the transition phase in which the convergent 
forces demobilize, and the recovery stage can begin. In catastrophic events, a 
significantly large convergent force is required for an extended period. Harrald states, 
                                                 
25 Quarantelli, “Catastrophes are Different from Disasters,” 3–6.  
26 Bruce L. Lindsay, Federal Emergency Management: A Brief Introduction (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42845.pdf  
27 John R. Harrald, “Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors For Disaster Response,” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604, no. 1 (2006): 256–272.  
28 Ibid., 260.  
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“planning for and transition to this force must be managed.”29 He also notes, “The 
success factors in each stage are linked; success in one phase is a precondition for success 
in the next.”30  
 
Figure 2.  Stages of Crisis Response Organizational Size Versus Time31 
Just as disasters are qualitatively and quantitatively different from everyday 
emergencies, catastrophes are of such a scale and impact to the social structure that they 
need special attention. The effects on organizations, communities, and society require 
different planning and response than do major disasters. Quarantelli states that reactions 
by individuals to disasters and catastrophes are both similar and good.32 However, he 
finds major changes at the organizational level that lead to poorer response: 
• There will be even slower organizational assessments of the problems in 
the situation.  
• There will be poorer and more inaccurate information flows between 
agencies  
                                                 
29 Ibid., 260.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 261.  
32 Quarantelli, “Catastrophes are Different from Disasters,” 6.  
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• There will be substantially greater difficulty in coordinating the organized 
response for an incident command system (that is a dubious arrangement 
even for disasters, and even less appropriate for a catastrophe)33    
These major differences are all influenced by communication. 
Fritz states that disasters are an “event concentrated in time and space, in which 
society or one of its subdivisions undergoes physical harm and social disruption, such 
that all or some essential functions of the society or subdivision are impaired.”34 
Catastrophe is not just greater devastation; it is “graver threat, uncertainty, urgency.35 
The emphasis for responders is on the social aspect of the event, the disruption of society, 
and the factors involved in the restoration of normality. The modern technical world is 
intensely interconnected. A massive disruption of infrastructure, a population at hazard, 
and the inability to communicate extends the chaos of the response phase. The focus of 
crisis management is to accelerate the restoration to stability. Catastrophic events are of a 
complexity and scope such that crisis management needs to reevaluate organizational 
models, policy, and strategy.  
ICS is inappropriate for a routine emergency, such as an automobile accident. 
Routine emergencies are qualitatively and quantitatively different from disasters, in 
which ICS functions well. However, the current crisis response planning and 
management practices approach catastrophes as large-scale disasters. Managing this type 
of crisis requires a change. It requires an effective and realistic communication strategy 
and an organization that can respond to the forces at work and the environment in a 
catastrophe. 
B. CHAOS AND COMPLEXITY 
Defining a phenomenon as chaotic and complex requires an understanding of how 
those words describe intricately interrelated parts in the universe and how those parts 
interact. “The greatest challenge today in all of science,” writes Wilson “is the accurate 
                                                 
33 Ibid.  
34 Fritz, “Disasters,” 655.  
35 Helsloot et al., Mega-crises, 5.  
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and complete description of complex systems.”36 Brian Castellani created a map of 
complexity science that illustrates the breadth of scholarship and research that have been 
performed in this field (see Figure 3).37 This visualization puts into perspective the 
difficulty of terming a system as complex but not understanding the ramifications. David 
Byrne defines complexity using three concepts: complexity is nonlinear, it deals with 
realism as an ontological principle, and it is evolutionary. In terms of this thesis, the 
holistic environment is the intersection and interrelation of social and natural systems.38 
A catastrophe creates a severe nonlinear disruption of the social system. The emerging 
forces self-organize, and networks grow and evolve.39 The social disruption releases 
forces (emergent and convergent) that require some manner of communication to 
integrate.40 Furthermore, the social forces are shaped following social, systems, and 
network theories.41 The objective of crisis response is to limit the destructive, chaotic 
state (return the social bounds to “normality”) by harnessing and organizing the complex 
forces of emergence and convergence. 
Disaster research (a branch of the social sciences) has devoted significant 
scholarly effort to advance and apply complexity science to understand the interrelated 
                                                 
36 Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 93. 
37 Brian Castellani, “Map of Complexity Science,” accessed July 15, 2014, http://scimaps.org/
mapdetail/map_of_complexity_sc_154   
38 David S. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences (New York: Routledge Publishing, 
1998).  
39 Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 1–3; Ilya Prigogine, Isabelle Stengers, and Alvin 
Toffler, Order out of Chaos (New York: Bantam Books, 1984); Stuart Kauffman, The Origins of Order 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1993).  
40 Kauffman, The Origins of Order; Prince, Catastrophe and Social Change; Charles Fritz, and John 
H. Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social Control (Washington, DC: 
National Academy of Sciences, 1957).   
41 Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences; Niklas Luhmann, “Systemtheorie, 
Evolutionstheorie und Kommunikationstheorie [System Theory, Evolution Theory, and Communication 
Theory],” in: Soziologische Aufklärung 2 [The Differentiation of Society], trans. Stephen Holmes and 
Charles Larmore (Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag), 193–203; Albert-László Barabási, Linked: 
The New Science of Networks (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing 2002); Ludwig von Bertalanffy, “An 
Outline of General System Theory,” British Journal for Philosophy of Science 1, no. 2 (1950): 134–165; 
Robert Axelrod, and Michael D. Cohen, Harnessing Complexity (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Per Bak, 
Chao Tang, and Kurt Wisenfeld, “Self-Organized Criticality: An Explanation of 1/f Noise,” Physical 
Review Letters 59, no. 4 (1987): 381–384.  
 16 
dynamic forces.42 These are a few of the many scholars who have attempted to define 
and explain how complexity and nonlinear theories represent reality and need 
consideration in crisis management.  
                                                 
42 Prince, Catastrophe and Social Change; Fritz, and Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters; 
Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences; Thomas E. Drabek, and David A. McEntire, “Emergent 
Phenomena and Multi-organizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature,” 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 22, no. 2 (2002): 197–224; Gary Kreps, and 
Susan L. Bosworth, “Disaster, Organizing, and Role Enactment: Structural Approach,” American Journal 
of Sociology 99, no. 2 (1993): 428–463. Louise K. Comfort, “Self-Organization in Complex Systems,” 
Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory (1994): 393–410; Ted G. Lewis, “Cause-and-Effect 
or Fooled by Randomness?” Homeland Security Affairs 6 (2010); Robert Stallings, and Enrico L. 
Quarantelli, “Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency Management,” Public Administration Review 45 
(1985): 93–100; Donald P. Moynihan, “The Network of Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of 
Incident Command Systems,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access 19 
no. 4 (2009): 1–21; Michael J. Bolton, and Gregory B. Stolcis, “Overcoming Failure of Imagination in 
Crisis Management: The Complex Adaptive System,” The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector 
Innovation Journal 13, no. 3 (2008): 1–12, http://www.innovation.cc/scholarly-style/bolton-
stolcis3dec2008v13i4.pdf; Patrick Lagadec, “A New Cosmology of Risks and Crises: Time for a Radical 
Shift in Paradigm and Practice,” Review of Policy Research 26, no. 4 (2009): 473–486, 
http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/New_Cosmology.pdf; Charles F. Parker, and Eric Paglia, “Hurricane 
Katrina: The Complex Origins of a Mega-Disaster,” in Mega-crises: Understanding the Prospects, Nature, 
Characteristics, and the Effects of Cataclysmic Events, ed. Ira Helsloot, Arjen Boin, Brian Jacobs, and 
Louise K. Comfort (51–65) (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 2012).  
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Figure 3.  Complexity Sciences43  
                                                 
43 Castellani, “Map of Complexity Science.” 
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C. CHAOS  
“Life is… nonlinear. And so is everything else of interest.”  
Heinz Pagels44 
High levels of uncertainty and unpredictability characterize disaster response; 
these are nonlinear events. The common goal of crisis response is to bring the affected 
area back to a stable state for recovery to begin. Crisis exposes a cloud of uncertainty for 
emergent and convergent response that is akin to the fog of war.45 A chaotic state is 
described as confused and disorganized. In a linear system, the relationship between 
relevant variables appears stable; cause and effect are proportional. Proportionality is not 
reflective of reality, and a system as complex as society is always nonlinear. In linear 
cause and effect thinking, a big change will have big consequences. A complex human 
crisis response system is robustly nonlinear.46 According to Kiel, “Nonlinearity refers to 
behavior in which the relationships between variables in a system are dynamic and 
disproportionate.”47 In addition, small changes can have big or unexpected consequences 
and often defy linear methodologies to forecast them.48 The systems are extremely 
sensitive to initial conditions, decisions, and actions. Actions taken within the initial 
chaos will have much greater and more unpredictable results in nonlinear systems than 
linear ones.49  
Crisis response is not a static system; there are constant changes in system state 
over time. A catastrophe is not similar to an event like a house fire that has a simple 
                                                 
44 Heinz Pagels, The Dreams of Reason (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988). 
45 L. Douglas Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management: Lessons for Managing 
Periods of Extreme Instability,” in What Disaster Response Management Can Learn from Chaos Theory, 
California Emergency Medical Services Authority–Conference Proceeding, ed. Gus Koehler, May 1995, 
https://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/96/05/over_12.html  
46 Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences.  
47 Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management,” 1.  
48 Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management;” Edward N. Lorenz, “Deterministic 
Nonperiodic Flow,” Journal Atmospheric Sciences 20, no. 2 (1963): 130–141.  
49 Lorenz, “Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow;” Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Disaster Relief 2.0: 
The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies (Washington, DC: UN Foundation & 
Vodafone Foundation Technology Partnership, 2011), 20.   
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straight-line extension.50 The chaotic systems behavior during a catastrophic event is 
limited by boundaries that severely diverge from the perceived normal. Behavior “refers 
to change in organizations and how organizational data evolve over time.”51 Nonlinear 
systems have three types of distinct behavior over time: 
• convergence to stability or equilibrium 
• stable oscillation 
• chaos 
Convergence to stability or equilibrium is a simple nonlinear behavior where from 
an initial point, the system quickly reaches and maintains stability. This behavior is not 
considered reflective of real-world systems but of an artificial construct of an ideal 
system. All complex systems experience variation over time, and this accounts for 
volatility and dynamism. Stable oscillation is reflective of normal patterns of life. This 
system reflects smooth patterns of predictable, incremental change.  
Chaos is characterized by behavior that seems random and disorderly over time 
but actually has definable parameters.52 While chaotic behavior appears disorderly, 
because it does not retrace prior sequences of behavior, it does behave in a recognizable 
pattern. The outcomes of this behavior occur within definable parameters; potential 
outcomes are not infinitely possible. According to Kiel, “Chaos thus looks like random 
behavior but is really unstable behavior over time that stays within clear boundaries.”53  
The goal of crisis response is to manage chaos: to bring order and stability. The 
research on controlling chaotic environments has resulted in three fundamental methods: 
parameters, perturbations (attractors), and orbits.54 
                                                 
50 Thomas Drabek, “Disaster in Aisle 13 Revisited,” in Disasters, Collective Behavior, and Social 
Organization, ed. Russell Dynes and Kathleen Tierney (26–44), (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware 
Press, 1994), 30.  
51 Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management,” 2. 
52 Ibid., 4. 
53 Ibid., 5.  
54 Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management,” 3; Edward Ott, Celso Grebogi, and 
James A. Yorke, “Controlling Chaos,” Physical Review Letters 64, no. 11 (1990): 1190–1193; William 
Ditto, and Louis Pecora, “Mastering Chaos,” Scientific American 269, no.2 (August 1993): 78–84.  
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• Altering the parameters: limiting the degrees of freedom or extent of 
behavior available to a system. The concept is to control behavior to create 
greater stability and predictability. The problem is the destructive forces 
are often beyond human control, and the capacity to mitigate it will be 
overwhelmed. This method is represented by a management theory that in 
order to achieve managerial goals, strict systems controls are needed to 
achieve levels of certainty and predictability.55  
• Introduction of attractors: the disproportional sensitivity of chaos can be 
brought back to a more ordered and stable state. The intent is to introduce 
“perturbations” to create a nonlinear effect, resulting in a phase shift from 
erratic to fluid behavior.56 These perturbations can be thought of as a 
“way of guiding purposeful action toward desired outcomes, although to 
do so we have to know a lot and be able to manage what we know in 
rather different ways.”57  
• Alter “orbits”: the concept is to alter the “orbit” of a system from chaos 
toward stability around systems attractors.58 
Attractors and orbits are interventions into a nonlinear system. These offer crisis 
response a possible avenue to manage chaos. Crisis management using perturbation must 
identify pressure points. This is a learning and adaptive approach that requires continual 
feedback to find the points that return the best results. This approach requires also open 
lines of communication and flexibility in management.59 The third approach for 
controlling chaos (altering orbits) is consistent with cybernetic approaches to 
management. Good organizations need the ability to be “self-connecting,” self-
organizing, and require effective methods of communication.60 Kiel explains, “These 
approaches rely on constant feedback to ensure that work and administrative systems are 
continuously adjusting to environmental and organizational demands and changes. Again, 
we see the importance of communication and feedback in efforts to control chaos.”61 
                                                 
55 Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management,” 7.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 16–17.  
58 Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management,” 7. 
59 Comfort, “Self Organization in Complex Systems.”  
60 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, “An Outline of General System Theory;” William R. Ashby, “Principles of 
the Self-organizing System,” Journal of General Psychology 37, no. 2 (1947): 266–267.  
61 Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management,” 7.  
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Comfort’s work on crisis response emphasizes the importance of modern information and 
communications technology as essential to accelerate the self-organization process.62  
The response forces (emergent and convergent) need communications—the 
ability to exchange and share information. Crisis management needs creative ways to 
manage chaos.63 In addition, chaos theory is a vital issue in crisis management: chaos 
inhibits decision making, coordination, initiative and creates inefficiencies.64 Ali 
Farazmand states that since chaos is an expected and a normal part of catastrophic events, 
surprise, novelty and complexity paralyze response systems and produce more chaos.65 
There is an urgent need within the crisis management community to develop the ability to 
manage “chaos and surprise.”66 The importance of understanding the dynamics of 
chaotic environments is that linear management techniques are ineffective if not 
counterproductive. The response community needs an adaptable organizational structure 
that has flexibility and agility and enables continuous flow of information.67 An 
alternative to a linear approach is an organizational structure that has command and 
control attributes that are open and dynamic.68  
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D. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
In an article in Nature Physics, Barabási remarks, “The daunting reality of 
complexity research is that the problems it tackles are so diverse that no single theory can 
satisfy all needs.”69 A catastrophic event disrupts the social system. It is impossible to 
understand the complexity unless the interconnected principles of systems are defined 
and also how that system can self-organize and reconnect in a destabilized nonlinear 
state. Barabási notes, “Although no theory can satisfy all needs, what we can strive for is 
a broad framework within which most needs can be addressed.”70 A social system 
requires a clear description of systems.  
In nonlinear systems thinking cause and effect are not proportionate. The web of 
complementary and supporting concepts and theories requires a holistic approach. The 
idea that communication is the essential ingredient for reordering a chaotic social system 
needs to be addressed, including how these concepts are linked together as a system. 
Moreover, it is essential to understand how complex social systems rely on 
communication and the manner in which communication is restored when confronted by 
massive disruption. Systems theory defines the functional mechanics and the 
relationships of sub-systems and components.71 The disrupted social system will 
reorganize, and the core element for self-organization is communication.72 The systems 
that emerge require a communication system. The emergent communications system will 
evolve along lines following network theory.73  
1. Systems Theory 
Since a catastrophe is a disruption of the social system, it is essential to 
understand what a system is. Ludwig von Bertalanffy developed the general system 
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theory to describe the collection of principles, models, and laws that are valid for 
“systems” in general.74 He was looking for universally applicable theory (or an organized 
body of knowledge) to produce a “logico-mathematical discipline… that is applicable to 
all sciences that are concerned with systems.”75 His work focused on a “holistic” 
approach, the interrelationships that defined how individual components together form 
the systems. A system is not just the sum of its parts. It also represents a collection of 
elements, interconnections, or relationships, and a function or purpose.76 The 
relationships within a system are the communications flows that allow a system to 
function.77 Those self-regulating or self-organizing dynamic systems require constant 
communications (feedback).78 Central to Bertalanffy’s work79 is the idea of the open 
systems, which are from studies in thermodynamics and biology. He calls “a system 
closed if no materials enter or leave it. It is open if there are inflow and outflow, and 
therefore change of the component materials.”80  
These concepts have had great effect on cybernetics, pioneered by Norbert 
Wiener and W. Ross Ashby. Cybernetics is the “study of control and communication” in 
complex systems.81 A system must control behavior, process and react to information, 
and adapt as a result.82 A catastrophic event represents an open, dynamic, disordered 
social system. The inflow and outflow are the convergent and emergent forces. These 
forces requires the restoration of a communication system. The system requires the 
formation of a network that passes information between and within, and this links 
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individuals and communities as well as integrates the converging efforts. The ability to 
exert control over chaotic environments by altering “orbits” requires continuous tracking 
and feedback.83 This concept is closely related to cybernetic theory.84 Network 
management of evolving systems requires close monitoring and careful intervention. The 
promotion of organizational connectivity or increasing an entity’s visibility within the 
system alters the “orbit.” These altered orbits become basins of attraction that have the 
ability to improve the restoration of stability. 
2. Social Theory 
According to Niklas Luhman, a complex social system requires a communication 
system.85 His article, “Systemtheorie, Evolutionstheorie und Kommunikationstheorie” 
organizes his grand social systems theory into three interconnected themes: 
• systems theory  
• communication theory  
• evolution theory86 
In Luhmann’s work, the elementary core for social systems is communication.87 
A social systems is made up of systems of communication. Society is defined as the most 
complex and comprehensive social system. A complex system requires information that 
is processed, distributed, and returns in a feedback loop.  
Niklas Luhmann’s general social theory is built on the concept that a social 
system’s self-organization requires self-referentiality.88 He bases his self-organization of 
social systems theory on the work of Humberto Maturana and Franciso Varela in the 
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book Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living.89 These concepts are 
supported by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, W. Ross Ashby, and Stuart 
Kauffman’s work on self-organization.90 For Luhmann, the essential elements of a social 
system are self-producing dynamic communications. As long as communication 
continues and encourages new lines of communication in a dynamic system, a social 
system can self-organize. “Society should no longer be considered as composed of 
human beings,” Luhmann states, “but as consisting of communications.”91 A disrupted 
society is one in which communications are difficult or impossible. Social action requires 
humans (nodes) to communicate via links on a network to other humans (nodes). 
Recovery entails restoration of a communications system that involves growth and 
recognizes the importance of feedback. Leot Leydesorff felt that communication and 
communication systems were vague and needed substance to be understood.92 He broke 
the system down into what needed to be communicated, mechanisms of communication 
within specified sub-systems, and how they interact. Leydesorff argued that it was 
incorrect to assume self-organization will not itself devolve into crisis.93  
All of these researchers are in agreement that all social systems are special 
communications systems and for self-organization to be successful stabilization of the 
environment is crucial.94 However, Leydesorff asserts that the process cannot be taken 
for granted. In Luhmann’s work, a reaction such as a catastrophic event (that amounts to 
the destruction of the social system and the interaction within the environment) requires 
system differentiation, that is, a division of a complex system into identical subsystems.95 
The impact of the catastrophe covers a wide area, but the communities themselves are 
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separately affected. From a destabilized dynamic social standpoint (combined with the 
disruption of communications), the communities represent initially independent smaller 
disasters within the context of the overall catastrophe. Luhmann believes this is the 
structural technique for solving the temporal problem of complex systems existing in 
complex environments.96  
3. Network Theory 
Modern network theory is relatively new. Network theory “aims to understand the 
origins and characteristics of networks that hold together the components in various 
complex systems.”97 Complexity strives to understand the relationship between things; 
network theory describes the characteristics and forces that these relationships exhibit. 
According to Barabási, the emergence of the World Wide Web, Internet, and historic 
network theory have “led to the discovery that despite the many differences in the nature 
of the nodes and the interactions between them, the networks behind most complex 
systems are governed by a series of fundamental laws that determine and limit their 
behavior.”98 Barabási also notes that the “holistic” approach to complexity reduced 
systems to the sum of their parts. According to Barabási, “Reductionism deconstructed 
complex systems, bringing us a theory of individual nodes and links. Network theory is 
painstakingly reassembling them, helping us to see the whole again.”99 Complex systems 
will not be understood unless there is an understanding of how these systems are 
supported by an elaborate web of interconnections and relationships between individual 
components.100 The changes in networking environments and the ability to map millions 
of links and nodes lead to a new understanding of the properties that define living 
networks. For the sake of brevity, we will avoid mapping the evolution of modern 
network science from the works on random networks by Erdős and Rényi, the small-
world networks of Stanley Milgram, Duncan Watts and Stephen Strogatz, the importance 
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of weak links by Mark Granovetter, the natural formation of hubs and connectors by 
Albert-László Barabási and Réka Albert, or the consequence of the power law to network 
distribution by Vilfredo Pareto. The importance of network science is the understanding 
how disordered and disrupted networks emerge and evolve following a common set of 
fundamental laws.101 
A simple network is described as a collection of nodes (vertices or actors) 
connected in some manner via links (edges or ties). Social network studies are primarily 
focused on social interrelations through centrality and connectivity. Centrality of a node 
measures the number of linkages as compared to other nodes. The highest linked nodes 
are considered the best connected or most influential, and the most connected nodes are 
also known as hubs. Connectivity determines the relationship of connections of 
individual nodes through the network. Mark Newman has divided networks into four 
loose categories: social networks, information networks, technological networks, and 
biological networks.102 The first three are of the most interest within the disorder 
following a catastrophic event. Following the impact of the event, the social network is 
shattered. Cascading infrastructure failures lead to the failure of the technology networks 
and the ability to satisfy the basic information needs is chaotic or non-existent.  
As modern systems and networks are more tightly coupled, failure in one system 
(i.e., power) can cause cascading failures. The failure of communications is the removal 
of a network that is central to social order. The reformation or self-organization of real-
world networks in this complex environment follows basic network rules for growth. The 
two most popular non-random models of networking that rely on the power-law 
distribution are small-world and scale-free.103  
The power-law distribution is fundamental to both models. The power law degree 
distribution model (sometimes called the 80–20 rule) expresses the relationship between 
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two quantities (see Figure 4). According to Watts, “The distribution of the number of 
network neighbors—the degree distribution—is typically right-skewed with a ‘heavy 
tail,’ meaning that a majority of nodes have less-than-average degree and that a small 
fraction of hubs are many times better connected than average.”104 This is described by 
Barabási and Reka as an:   
independent of the system and the identity of its constituents, the 
probability P(k) that a vertex in the network interacts with k other vertices 
decays as a power law, following p(k) ∼ k−α. This result indicates that 
large networks self-organize into a scale-free state.105  
 
 
Figure 4.  Normal and Power Law Distribution106 
 
 In the article, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” Watts and 
Strogatz built on the popular “six-degrees” of separation to explain how real-world 
networks are neither strictly regular nor completely random (see Figure 5).107 The natural 
(and efficient) state of large real-world networks (social, technical, biological, or 
information) will result in a number of large clusters (highly connected nodes) with small 
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linkage paths between nodes.108 Using the “prisoner’s dilemma” model, Watts and 
Strogatz found decreasing levels of cooperation testing the various stratagems as short 
cuts decrease or when randomness increases.109 
Barabási and Reka revealed large networks with complex topologies self organize 
into a scale-free state.110 This study focused on emergent network properties in complex 
large networks. Additionally, Barabási and Reka came to the conclusion that two generic 
mechanisms were at work: “(i) networks expand continuously by the addition of new 
vertices (nodes or actors), and (ii) new vertices attach preferentially to sites that are 
already well connected.”111 This “preferential attachment” is central to the understanding 
that in real-world networks, there are hubs and clusters that are essential to network 
growth. They are considered “ubiquitous, a generic building block in our complex 
interconnected world.”112   
 
Figure 5.  Small-world, Scale-free and Random Networks113 
The ability to assert control over a chaotic environment is the use of perturbations 
and orbits.114 These controls represent interventions during the catastrophic event that 
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can speed the return to stability. The perturbations are the rapid telecommunications and 
technology teams (RTAT) and HFN principles that are injected into the environment as 
attractors, which create numerous basin of attraction where they operate). These basins of 
attraction are hubs—highly connected centers supported by ICT efforts. However, the 
lack of ICT support will the inhibit growth of these hubs. These hubs will serve as 
organizing points, the focus of local communication and networking efforts, the engine 
for self-organization and adaption, and the integrator of convergent efforts. The hubs 
naturally form as networks grow and self-organize and become orbits.  
Barabási finds that network evolution is governed by growth, preferential 
attachment, and fitness attributes.115 A communications strategy requires an 
understanding of how these mechanisms work. This strategy seeks to create, support, and 
expand HFNs, and one primary objective is to create an environment that promotes 
network growth. Improving connectivity raises the number of competitors vying for 
attention within the network. Dynamic network evolution will develop highly connected 
nodes, or hubs. These hubs develop following preferential attachment and fitness 
attributes. Preferential attraction describes the phenomena where nodes that have the 
greatest number of links are most likely to receive new links, evolving into hubs.116  
The qualities of a node, the ability to provide services, quality of its products are 
examples of fitness. Fitness explains how late-comers to a network environment compete 
and overcome an initial lack of links.117 This concept describes how Google could come 
from relative obscurity to becoming the biggest and most popular search engine.118 ICT 
support is the limiting factor.  
Greater interconnection is essential to better response, but this can cause problems 
if not managed. The Haiti earthquake response had greater connectivity and unmanaged, 
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it lead to information overload.119 Though there are information management challenges, 
efforts to accelerate linkage will create a network that will conform to network evolution 
theories. The highly connected hubs will become orbits around which alter nonlinear 
environment boundaries. These hubs will be centers of recovery or influence.120 
Additionally, these highly connected hubs represent individual localized basins of 
attraction within the chaotic environment.121 Without convergent intervention applying a 
strategy that strives to create HFNs, the formation and organization will be slow. A 
successful strategy will aggressively and hastily reestablish and expand the 
communications networks. These emergent networks require significant effort to manage 
the vast amounts of data inflows.  
E. EMERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE 
Catastrophes release massive social forces. Though all the forces are an emergent 
social response, there needs to be a differentiation. The forces from within the affected 
region and the disrupted population are the emergent forces. The convergent force is the 
external response from outside the affected area directed toward the event. These two 
forces are separated and divided by the failure of information and communications 
subsystems. 
A catastrophic event creates a massive disruption in a highly structured complex 
social system (and the interrelated subsystems). Emergence in complex systems is the 
collective behavior that drives the restoration of order and structure.122 This natural 
process “leads to the appearance of a structure not directly described by the defining 
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constraints and instantaneous forces that control a system.”123 A disrupted social system 
continues to maintain a high level of structure. This structure, combined with time and 
interaction with interrelated complex systems (technical, crisis response, environmental), 
effects emergent collective behavior.124 The emergence of spontaneously ordered 
behavior is central to an understanding of self-organization. In addition, it is an open 
system response to some change and the release of self-directed energy and matter.125 
This behavior is a property of complex systems. The emergent social forces in disorder 
will self-organize and adapt but are limited by access to communications. 
Disaster researchers have continually observed emergent behavior in social 
systems faced with crisis.126 A social system in disorder will lead to emergent self-
organization and adaption. Instability in a system provides energy for this behavior (in 
commerce, politics, and nature). It is most active at the edge of chaos where emergent 
and adaptive behavior is in a state that allows for growth. It is inhibited by extreme chaos 
or widely bounded nonlinearity—an inability to communicate.127  
A social system in chaos represents a fracturing of the social network.128 At that 
point in time (and place), it is not a functioning social system. Social energy is first 
directed to reestablish communication within the bounds of available technology. In the 
aftermath of a catastrophic event, networks and communication reform within the limits 
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of the available technology and spans are extremely localized. Communication is the 
required ingredient to encourage emergent self-organization.129 The 2013 National 
Response Framework (NRF) calls for the “whole community approach”—a wholistic 
approach to crisis response that acknowledges the importance of engaging emergent 
forces.130 An accepted assumption of crisis responders is that most of the response efforts 
will come from local organizations and emergent forces. 
Significant literature has been devoted to emergent behavior during times of crisis 
by leading disaster researchers.131 Private citizens and local officials immediately begin 
to reorganize after a catastrophe. Emergent social behavior in catastrophe is the localized 
social energy that coalesces, organizes, and responds to perceived needs.132 As Prince 
noted in 1920, “The vital place of communication in society was recognized at once. It is 
a major influence in association, and upon it in disaster depends on the immediacy as 
well as the adequacy of relief.”133  
Thomas Drabek and David McEntire identify emergent groups as individuals and 
groups that are “volunteers, emergency workers, churches, businesses, government 
agencies and other concerned or curious parties.”134 These forces are an essential 
component to a successful response.135 Furthermore, emergent groups are not constrained 
(or organized) by traditional crisis response systems. These reflexive self-organizational 
and adaptive forces respond to immediate crisis and, in many instances, are 
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improvements to response and organization.136 Within disorder there is order,137 and the 
existing social structures are an attractor.138 They do represent significant challenges to 
organizing, coordinating and logistics.139 Furthermore, the pace of self-organization is 
limited by communication.140 Without a functioning communications system, the small 
ad-hoc emergent groups are isolated and unorganized. These uncoordinated groups 
represent significant potential, but they require assistance from outside. This is the 
intersection of emergence and convergent forces. 
Outside of the impacted areas, the extended social systems respond to a 
catastrophic event. This response represents a form of movement towards a central 
gravitational field (the affected communities) from outside the affected region.141 This 
has been a common characteristic of crisis response to affected communities that have 
insufficient resources.142  
Fritz and Mathewson identify the forms of convergence:  
• personal—the actual movement of persons (official and voluntary) 
• informational—movement or transmission of data 
• material—movement of supplies and equipment143 
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Crisis management needs to content with both positive and negative impacts of social 
response.144 The perception of the event’s impact will relate to the size and complexity of 
the external convergence.145  
Fritz and Mathewson note the importance of communication to successfully 
integrate convergent forces.146 Informational convergence represents the general need to 
understand the situation. Examples of this can be offers of assistance, formal inquiries, 
media convergence, and expressions of concern or the formation of common operating 
picture (COP). However, this does create challenges, such as overloading of 
communication facilities.147 Fritz and Mathewson note: “The most immediate and crucial 
need in disasters is “speedy, accurate, authoritative information, coordinated and adapted 
to the specific needs of various groups concerned with the.”148 They observe:  
The general picture that emerges from an analysis of numerous disaster 
reports is a mosaic of formal and informal efforts to reconnoiter and assess 
the situation, conflicting initial reports, gross ambiguities and inaccuracies 
in both the word-of-mouth and mass media announcements, and lack of 
coordination among the various information-gathering, evaluating and 
disseminating agencies.149 
Fritz and Mathewson conducted the study during a period of relatively simplistic 
communications options, yet these observations are still relevant.150 They recommend the 
creation of an informational-specialist corps that would rapidly deploy, set-up forward 
operations posts in the affected communities, and focus on the collection, coordination, 
and dissemination of information. This corps would also have the personnel to handle 
information and communication technology (ICT) challenges. During operations, this 
would integrate with local personnel to promote efficient operations.151 This 
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recommendation is remarkably similar to the rapid technology assessment teams 
(RTAT),152 or the UN Fast Information Technology and Telecommunication Emergency 
and Support Team (FITTEST) units.  
Emergent and convergent forces are a constant in disaster response. The challenge 
is to coordinate these forces in the shortest amount of time. The common problem is the 
lack of connectivity and information management. Additionally, communication can alter 
the balance of the system. The group with access to communication will achieve 
dominance. Furthermore, communication access will affect the response since it is 
impossible with certainty to determine if that group is well led and or has the capabilities 
to provide services. A power shift among the emergent groups can have unforeseen 
consequences and lead to mismanagement. 
First responders play a central role in the intersection between emergent and 
convergent forces. The first response personnel represent the local government and serve 
as a bridge; however, the local first-response communities are often victims themselves. 
Stallings and Quarantelli note that during a crisis, social roles often change.153 A fire 
chief could be responsible for emergency housing, or a local elected official could 
assume responsibilities that are unforeseen. These adaptions of roles are a product of self-
organization forces.154  
The National Response Framework (NRF)155 and disaster researchers are in 
agreement on the whole community approach: that emergent forces represent the energy 
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and manpower that is essential to successful response.156 This force requires 
communication to be effective. A primary objective for convergent forces is to provide 
the ICT support.  
F. INFORMATION REVOLUTION 
Information and communication technology is experiencing exponential 
transformative changes. The methods and power to connect, share information, process 
data, and create knowledge is accelerating and growing in complexity. It must be 
acknowledged that the Information Revolution is a component of crisis response 
environment that represents transformational changes, momentous challenges, novel 
vulnerabilities, and potential unimagined solutions. The changes are so rapid and 
powerful that crisis responders must acknowledge this challenge with regards to the 
organization and management.157 Management systems that are based primarily on 
paper-based processes or an overwhelming reliance on push-to-talk radios do not 
leverage the potential power of advanced ICT. 
Communication failures during crisis response are a common theme that has not 
been abated with the advent of advanced information and communication 
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technologies.158 Though communication is a constant problem, the rate of technical 
change in:  
information technologies such as networks, mobile and distributed 
systems, databases, data analysis and mining, image processing, security, 
decision-support tools, etc., are incorporated in the research activities with 
the objective of revolutionize the ability to gather, manage, analyze and 
disseminate information in crisis response.159  
According to Barabási, “Fuelled by cheap sensors and high-throughput 
technologies, the data explosion that we witness today, from social media to cell biology, 
is offering unparalleled opportunities to document the inner workings of many complex 
systems.”160 Technological and social communications are not static but dynamic, 
interrelated open systems that require the crisis response community to challenge long-
established management systems. The environment of change represented by 
advancement of communication systems is integral to the understanding of modern 
communications and social systems.  
G. DISASTER RESPONSE MODELS 
The focus of this thesis is the catastrophic event, and it is assumed that this type 
of event would require federal response. The response follows mandated management 
and planning doctrines that shape domestic crisis response. The first case study on 
Hurricane Katrina focuses on the failure to implement a comprehensive communication 
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strategy within the framework of the National Response Plan. The second case study 
compares an international response during the earthquake in Haiti. An international 
response, such as the one in Haiti, follows different protocols and management policies. 
The commonality is a failure to rapidly reestablish communications and the impact on 
response. 
U.S. policies define the relationships between governmental agencies (federal, 
state, local, and tribal), private industries, and citizens. The central documents for this 
research are the National Response Plan (NRP) or National Response Framework (NRF) 
(after Katrina), National Incident Management System (NIMS),161 Incident Command 
System (ICS) and the Emergency Support Functions: (ESF) #2—Communications Annex 
and ESF #5 Emergency Management. These are supported by considerable live official 
sources that illustrate programs, efforts and policies on local, state and the federal levels.  
The policy and planning documentation has been through significant revisions, 
notably in 2008 and 2013. The 2008 revision represents a response to the perceived 
failures during Hurricane Katrina. The communication and information are elevated but 
the management resources are still fragmented. The 2013 revision has the benefit of 
experiences drawn upon from the Hurricane Sandy response. The FEMA and DHS 
archives have been invaluable resources of official documentation and policy statements. 
Tracking the evolution of these planning and policy documents demonstrates three points 
of understanding in time:  
• 2004—Lack of understanding of the communication process. The 
expectation that the introduction of ICS would create an environment that 
standardized management and communication processes. The timing of 
the changes to national response (and resulting unfamiliarity), the political 
environment, and the scope of Katrina created a communications disaster 
that impeded effective response.  
• 2008—The reaction to Katrina saw increased focus on communication but 
an overall strategy is missing. The National Emergency Communications 
Plan (NECP) focuses primarily on interoperability; this is not a systems 
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approach.162 The resources and authority continue to be fragmented within 
ICS and ESF.  
• 2013—The continuation of 2008 policies after the experiences of 
Hurricane Sandy. As of December 2014 the NRF, NECP and the ESF 
have been updated; NIMS has not. 
Hurricane Katrina examines the domestic crisis response strategy and failure to 
develop and execute a communications strategy. The converging forces are in the best 
position after impact to begin the process of reestablishing a communications system. 
These forces can arrive with trained, organized personnel and resource. These fresh 
forces would begin the process of assessment and restoring connectivity as the local 
responders and emergent forces are organizing. The official reporting proved to be 
essential source for the study, these (but not limited to) include: Hurricane Katrina: A 
Nation Still Unprepared (US Senate, 2006),163 A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report 
of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina (US House of Representatives, 2006)164 and The to Hurricane 
Katrina: Lessons (White House, 2006).165  
After Hurricane Katrina the National Response Plan (NFP) was updated to 
correct the mishandling of communication (US DHS NFP, 2004; U.S. DHS NRF, 
2008).166 The plans take into account the importance of communication without 
establishing a comprehensive strategy for its reestablishment. It is important to compare 
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efforts and changes to the National Response Framework since Hurricane Katrina to 
assess the mandated improvements that relate to communication and crisis response. 
The second case study is an examination of international response to a 
catastrophic event (the earthquake in Haiti). The UN response model has some core 
similarities with the U.S. model, namely the emergency support functions are analogous 
to the UN Cluster System. However, the UN system does not rely on ICS and the overall 
management of the system is the responsibility of the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA). A major international crisis response has far 
greater obstacles to successful communications than those presented solely within the 
U.S.  
The UN response system has devoted greater resources to communication and 
information management, but still the result was a communications disaster in Haiti. The 
problems that manifested during Haiti were a result of underestimatingof the rapidly 
advancing technical environment. The amounts of data and the inability to manage the 
data overwhelmed the UN communications efforts. Furthermore, the UN response did not 
have a practical communication strategy and emergent forces were not effectively 
networked in a timely manner. The response to Haiti represented a failure of 
communication due to insufficient appreciation of the technical environment, the greater 
need for increased ICT resources, and the understanding that communication and 
information management are a first-order priority. 
H. HASTILY FORMED NETWORKS 
Historically, converging force have been unable to quickly restore 
communications, and the selected case studies reflect the effect on response performance. 
The urgent need for communications, sharing of information, and restoring order require 
the converging forces make a rapid restoration of a communications a primary strategic 
objective. The hastily formed network concept is method to address communications that 
has been developed at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  
During the chaotic response, communication is a primal need that crisis 
responders will achieve by any means. The need to communicate will drive entities to 
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independently begin to search for ad-hoc technological solutions. The DHS performance 
review of FEMA during Hurricane Katrina named “unreliable communication systems” 
and FEMA’s inability to adequately restore basic communications to wide areas within 
the effected zone as a key responsibility failure.167  
NPS developed the hastily formed network (HFN) concept and created a center 
devoted to improving and enhancing communication, cooperation, and collaboration at 
future disasters. An HFN is a rapidly established network of people from different 
communities who are working together in a shared conversation space in which they 
plan, commit to, and execute actions, to fulfill a large, urgent mission.168 
Peter Denning explains that the HFN concept “is more than a set of organizations 
using advanced networking technology (Denning 2006 pg. 17).169 The HFN concept 
addresses communications networks aimed at rapidly connecting the unconnected. The 
first step is creating links between people, communities, and organizations to improve the 
ability to share knowledge, develop a common operating picture, “access options, plan 
responses, decide, commit, act and coordinate.170 The key elements are the technical 
solutions to create a communications network and the manner (the system) in which they 
interact.171  
After the HFN-team deployment in Haiti, Brian Steckler used experiences in 
catastrophic environments to formulate the rapid technology assessment team (RTAT) 
concept.172 He proposed the use of rapidly deployable, “small, nimble, multi-
organizational, multi-national integrated teams of specialists in key ICT areas (wireless 
data communications, voice communications, radio technologies, power, information 
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sharing, social networking, etc.).”173 The teams would provide quality assessment of the 
information and communication technology power situation by experts and distribute this 
reliable, trusted information.174 Additionally, these teams represent a method to control 
chaos through the introduction of small perturbations. The theory is that small technical 
teams that are focused on ICT reconnaissance and assisting an aggressive restoration of 
communication represents small changes that will have nonlinear effects on the chaotic 
environment. The use of these teams will require careful pre-planning and extensive 
feedback once committed. This first wave begins the reestablishment of a network 
working from identified centers of organization and linking adjacent nodes (organizing 
emergent groups). These are the beginnings of an overall communications strategy.  
The advances in ICT have created new challenges for crisis response and new 
possibilities in organizational structure.175 Though response community acknowledges 
the importance of communication, little has been done to change the relationship of 
communication objectives within the framework of domestic management models. 
Karlene Roberts’s research into high reliability organizations (HROs) identifies dynamic 
complex socio-technological systems that require a functioning communication and a 
learning process loop.176 Crisis response systems strive to utilize advanced technology. 
The issue is that domestic crisis response (following the ICS model) utilizes ICT in 
support of operations, planning, logistic, and administration sections. There needs to be a 
change in organization and management models that organizes the information and 
communications efforts into a group or branch with authority, resources, and 
independence to pursue a comprehensive communication strategy. 
The use of HFN and RTATs represent a commitment to a communications 
strategic objective: the reestablishment of disrupted networks. The next step is to support 
and manage the evolution of the growing HFN. The initial networks will be small and 
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weak but represent and engagement of the converging forces to the affected communities. 
The goal is to quickly provide networks that will foster self-organization and adaption by 
emergent forces and the integration of converging forces. The converging forces are in 
the position with resources and technical expertise. The missing ingredient is a plan that 
recognizes the importance and independence of ICT objectives. This importance is 
reflected by an organizational change that makes ICT related services a section within 
ICS equal to operations, planning, logistics, and administration (and a part of the general 
staff). A new section acknowledges that some communications strategic objectives are 
not just to support other sections. The communications strategy will focus on creating, 
growing, and managing a hastily formed network using advanced ICT. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The first step in this research was to define the context. The words: catastrophe, 
complexity, chaos, and systems are so commonly used in crisis research that the meaning 
can become opaque. Establishing a context sets clearer boundaries for the case studies. 
The research required a substantial survey of the literature that defines the event and the 
concepts. As would be expected, any inquiry into complexity reveals the interrelation of 
systems and the role communications plays in self-organization. The review of the 
literature provided the overall framework: catastrophe is a severe disruption to a large 
segment of socio-technical systems, communications is a foundational system for self-
organizing, and effective response requires restoration of communication systems.  
The research for this thesis relies on two case studies (Hurricane Katrina and 
earthquake in Haiti 2010). These two studies meet the environmental criteria of a 
catastrophic event complicated by a near total failure of the communications 
infrastructure. The case studies offer contrasting crisis response models (domestic and 
international). Though the approach to crisis response is very different, the commonality 
is a failure to restore a communications system. 
The comparative case study method was selected to allow the careful 
consideration of the qualitative and quantitative data. The studies serve to define the 
phenomenon in context.177 The studies represent a narrative of the effects of a 
catastrophe on complex socio-technical systems, crisis response systems, and 
communications systems. The overarching consideration is the communications situation 
presented to converging forces and the efforts made to improve the situation during the 
initial chaotic period.  
The two studies were selected based on several criteria. Catastrophic events are 
not regularly occurring; thus, the data set is small.  
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Case studies criteria: 
• Hurricane Katrina and earthquake in Haiti (criteria): 
• Both events had access to modern networking technology 
• Near total failure of the communications infrastructure 
• Complex emergency response from substantial numbers of diverse 
agencies, groups, volunteer entities, non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) 
• Technical challenges comparable  
• Well-documented, official reports, after action review (AAR), 
lessons learned (LL) 
• Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Hastily Formed Network (HFN) 
deployment 
• Different crisis response organizational framework  
There has not been a widely embraced or successful solution to rapid 
reestablishment of communications in the initial chaotic stage of a catastrophic event. 
The differing framework allows the research to define common problems that are not 
linked to policy or regional procedures. The deployment of NPS HFN team provides 
essential data and observations from a specialized unit that is solely tasked with rapid 
restoration of ICT.  
The methodologies used to research the case studies are: 
• Assess after action reviews, lessons learned documents, articles, and 
academic peer-reviewed theses related to the two case studies. 
• Examine official documentation for domestic crisis response as it relates 
to communication strategy 
• Determine efficacy of HFN model using deployment reports, after action 
reviews, and industry related articles. 
• Conduct comprehensive review network data from studies on Hurricane 
Katrina.  
The Hurricane Katrina network was evaluated using different data sources 
utilizing different collection methods (see Appendix A). Three studies pertaining to 
Hurricane Katrina serve as a basis of the research. The data from three studies were 
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examined using social network analysis (SNA) tools to confirm the results and to 
examine specific aspects of the crisis response networks. The studies are:  
• Carter Butts, Ryan Acton, and Christopher Marcum’s “Interorganizational 
Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response” (data publicly 
available)178 
• Louise K. Comfort at the University of Pittsburgh, Center for Disaster 
Management179 
• Naim Kapucu at the Department of Public Administration, University of 
Central Florida180 
The Hurricane Katrina data was kindly provided by the University of Pittsburgh and the 
University of Central Florida, and the study by Butts, Acton, and Marcum was publically 
available.  
Analysis of the Haiti response network uses studies conducted by the University 
of Pittsburgh, Center for Disaster Management. Additionally, the research of the Haiti 
networks was confined to an analysis of the network statistics. This analysis found 
network evolution and structural similarities.  
This framework represents the guiding principles for operations. One of the goals 
of the thesis is to provide recommendations for future domestic crisis response. For that 
reason, the research into the domestic crisis response official and mandated organization 
is probed in a vigorous manner. The UN response to Haiti allows the examination of 
contrasting organizational and management styles within a similar context and with 
similar results (as they apply to the rapid establishment of communications systems).  
The use of the case studies and empirical data allows the building of a theory.181 
The method by this research is a combination of historic narrative of the relevant facts 
and empirical data analysis using SNA to reveal common patterns in crisis response 
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networks. The emergent theory is that chaos can be controlled (perturbations and 
alterations of orbits) by crisis response. Crisis response requires the creation and 
implementation of a new communication systems strategy, altering ICS to pursue that 
strategy and utilizing hastily formed network concepts as well as rapid technology 
assessment and technology teams. 
A goal of this research is to define a serious common problem in crisis response. 
The examination of shared failures and successes to provide solutions and smart practices 
for future disaster response. The importance is obvious: greater efficiency in crisis 










IV. HURRICANE KATRINA 
“By any measure, Hurricane Katrina was a national catastrophe.”182 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast with catastrophic consequences, 
and one of the largest natural disasters in contemporary United States history. The storm 
destroyed much of New Orleans. The crisis response covered a vast area containing 
approximately 1.5 million people in the Gulf Coast. The most essential response 
objective was the rapid restoration of a communications system. According to Comfort 
and Haase, “The task of mobilizing a coherent, coordinated warning and response system 
for this catastrophic storm was massively complex.”183 The vital importance of 
communications and their effects on response is a constant theme running through 
disaster research.184 The quality of communication systems in extreme crisis has a direct 
correlation to successful complex response. This was evident “in the halting 
intergovernmental response to Hurricane Katrina, beginning on August 23, 2005.”185 The 
lack of a functioning communication system created massive problems for decision 
makers, led to uncoordinated response, and handicapped self-organization within the 
affected communities.  
This case study examines the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf states and 
the response, focusing on the inability to reestablish communication as the leading cause 
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for the failure. The response lacked an overarching communications strategy and the 
communications was considered a support function rather than a strategic imperative. 
The response to Katrina demonstrated a lack of preparation and emphasis on a 
communications strategy, the inability to rapidly reestablish communications, create a 
workable network, or collect incoming data within an efficient information management 
system. Without useful information, the converging forces were unable to act in a flexible 
or agile manner, information was not shared, which affected decision making, and as a 
result, the affected communities were isolated.  
B. IMPACT 
The titles of two major congressional reports clearly captures the general opinion 
of the response: The titles of the two congressional reports clearly captures the general 
opinion of the response: Select House Committee, “A Failure of Initiative”186 and the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “A Nation Still 
Unprepared.”187 These reports have a common theme: that communications posed a 
serious problem both during the storm and in its immediate aftermath.188 Without 
communication, there was very little overall direction for the responding forces, self-
organization of the affected population was severely handicapped, and the chaos of the 
response phase was extended. The loss of communication also created an isolated 
response during which the responders were unable to define the immediate needs and 
goals without accurate, timely, and verifiable information. According to Pijnenburg and 
Van Duin, “Most of the time crisis situations turn out to be, to a large extent, information 
and communication crises.”189 
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In the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, the impact of 
the storm created unprecedented needs and challenges. “Hurricane Katrina impacted 
nearly 93,000 square miles across 138 parishes and counties.”190 Official reports are very 
critical of the response on all levels and called for changes to national crisis response.191 
The physical effects of the storm were severe (see Table 1). The misery was compounded 
by a disaster response that was characterized as “failure of government at all levels to 
plan, prepare for, and respond aggressively to the storm. These failures were not just 
conspicuous; they were pervasive.”192 The U.S. Senate’s report went on, noting, “the 
suffering that continued in the days and weeks after the storm passed did not happen in a 
vacuum; instead, it continued longer than it should have.”193 In addition, the report 
consistently identified an inability to communicate or rapidly reestablish communication 
as the central factor in the response failure.  
Table 1.   Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment194 
Storm related deaths 1,577 
Homes destroyed 300,000 
Land area damaged by Hurricane Katrina 90,000 sq. miles 
Estimated economic loss related to Hurricane Katrina $125–$150 billion 
Electric customers, all types, left without power by storm 1.7 million 
Customers without phone service 3 million 
Cellular towers damage (out of 7,000) 1,000 
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Much of the communications systems infrastructure was destroyed, negatively 
affecting response, severely limiting situational awareness, and contributing to severe 
problems communicating operational plans or engaging local response.195 According to a 
White House report, “Almost three million phone lines were knocked out, telephone 
switching centers were seriously damaged.”196 This lead to the collapse of many 911 call 
centers.197 Wireless communications were also affected, approximately 1,477 cell towers 
were out of service, and widespread power loss left few places to charge the phones.198 
The damaged included most radio and television as well as first responders dispatch 
systems.199 Many emergency operation centers (EOC) were rendered unusable due to 
flooding or other damage, eliminating a base for command operations and resulting in 
poor coordination and wasted time as responders looked for new locations.  
The hurricane impact and flooding, combined with massive infrastructure failure, 
caused the social disruption that left the survivors, isolated, disorganized, and in chaos. 
This was an environment that was extremely chaotic and complex. Convergent forces 
have the greatest influence on reestablishing a communications system, bringing trained 
personnel and resources from outside the impacted zones. The Katrina response was a 
continuation of crisis management mistakes of devoting insufficient resources and 
inadequate pre-planning to crisis response communications. 
C. CONTEXT  
Donald Moynihan clearly frames the situation leading up to Hurricane Katrina 
catastrophe as the “first major disaster that took place after the introduction of new crisis 
management policies, and represents their first critical test.”200 At the time, DHS and 
FEMA where going through a major reorganization. The National Response Plan (NRP) 
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and the emergency support functions (ESF) were newly written (published in 2004 and 
2005 respectively),201 and the Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA)202 had not yet 
been published. Misunderstanding and unfamiliarity lead to conflicts and organizational 
confusion.203 The U.S. Senate report found the National Communications System (a 
DHS agency), primarily responsible for providing communications support to first 
responders during disasters, had no plans to do so.204 
The failure can be traced to the dysfunctional system that inhibited the creation of 
response networks and to an inability to restore social stability. At the foundation was a 
failure to understand the dependence of socio-technical systems on a functioning 
communications system. The NRP focus was on the organizational responsibilities and 
management of a complex response system.205 The expectation is that the organizational 
system will generate networks and relationships across clearly defined lines. In a stable 
state environment, this assumption would be difficult to support; however, during 
catastrophe, it has proved to be a major response gap.  
D. DISCONNECTION 
According to the A Failure of Initiative, “The Katrina network was so large that 
there was a failure to fully comprehend all of the actors actually involved.”206 According 
to NOAA, “entire coastal communities were obliterated, some left with little more than 
the foundations upon which homes, businesses, government facilities, and other historical 
buildings once stood.”207 A large number of people either failed or were unable to 
evacuate. These victims presented the response with an enormously complex task of 
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providing rescue, relief, and support. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina notes 
that DHS reported the communications infrastructure in Biloxi and Gulfport as “non-
existent.”208 Additionally, the governor of Mississippi observed, “My head  of the 
National Guard might as well have been a Civil War general.”209 Each affected 
community lacking communication became a disconnected and isolated social subsystem. 
The U.S. House of Representatives official report notes, “Massive 
communications damage and a failure to adequately plan for alternatives impaired 
response efforts, command and control, and situational awareness.”210 According to 
Patrick Lagadec, the contemporary “environment demands dynamic linkages, fluidity and 
speed, shared information, and collective confidence.”211 Private citizens perform the 
majority of crisis response, and they do not respond well to management styles that rely 
on chains of command or hierarchical command structures. This force is not an official 
part of the national crisis response system and interaction with this essential force is 
delicate.212 The data from the response demonstrates that the converging forces were 
unable to rapidly reestablish communications or effectively engage with localized 
response. This posed a significant obstacle for self-organization of the affected 
communities. The A Failure of Initiative report states, “The poor situational awareness, 
and its resulting effect on command and control, contributed to the negative effects of 
inaccurate or unsubstantiated media reports because public officials lacked the facts to 
address what the media reported.”213  
The U.S. Senate report notes that some private-sector entities were successful 
dealing with communications.214 The Wal-Mart retail merchandise chain used lessons 
learned from previous hurricanes to focus on ICT crisis strategy. Wal-Mart Chief 
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Information Officer (CIO) Linda Dillman led an aggressive ICT effort to prepare the 
company for crisis.215 This included building a Wal-Mart EOC, active participation in 
employees in the communication process, and the creation of robust assessment tools. 
Wal-Mart was able to maintain or restore communication with store within the affected 
area and provide essential services. Senator Joe Lieberman testified that Wal-Mart 
became distribution points for emergency resources.216 These stores were able to 
continue (and expand) operations because Wal-Mart emphasized communication.  
The converging forces had significant communications assets. FEMA supports 
five mobile emergency response support (MERS) detachments. These units are designed 
for rapid deployment to provide crisis communications and operational and logistical 
support. The five MERS detachments serve the 10 FEMA regions. Additionally, MERS 
detachment is capable of serving a large field office and distributing smaller units to 
several field sites. Finally, MERS rapid response teams have the ability to deliver support 
through satellite terminals, cellular telephones, and computers.  
Only two MERS detachments were activated before Hurricane Katrina made 
landfall.217 These two detachments were inadequate. The convergent forces had not 
prepared for the massive disruption of the communication infrastructure. The primary 
communication method for Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) with 
the affected counties was solely through satellite phones and radios.218 A MERS 
detachment responded to the state EOC in Jackson, Mississippi to provide satellite 
communications systems;219 “However, despite the presence of MERS and hand-held 
satellite phones in all of the affected counties’ EOCs, the Federal Coordinating Officer 
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for Mississippi, Bill Carwile, testified that communications capabilities were far short of 
what was needed to be effective.”220 
Unfortunately, the MERS units were not aggressively engaged. Without an 
overall communications strategy, these units supported command, operations, logistics, 
and administrative functions. The detachments had significant capabilities, but they were 
insufficiently deployed and then used only as support. The Hurricane Pam exercise had 
recommended rapidly deployable assessment teams.221 This concept would have 
deployed ICT reconnaissance teams providing trusted sources of socio-technical 
challenges. This continues to be a gap in domestic response. 
In contrast during Hurricane Sandy, six MERS detachments deployed and were 
supported by innovation teams (to engage emergent issues), incident management 
assessment teams (IMAT), which were supported by the new FEMA Disaster Emergency 
Communications (DEC) division and the Regional Emergency Communication 
Coordination Working Group (RECCWG).222 At the same time, local FEMA officials 
experimented with ICT assessment teams that focused upon coordinating 
communications efforts using both governmental assets and collaborating with private 
industry.223 These efforts were not just in support of operational and logistic concerns but 
to assist state, local, and the affected population.224 These communications initiatives are 
a result of lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina but are not reflected in changes to 
NIMS, NECP, or incorporated into the official ICS guides. This is a more robust 
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approach and demonstrates greater emphasis on communication and the pursuit of 
restoration as a primary mission objective as opposed to a support mission. The key 
concept is that there must be plans in place before the impact.  
1. Hastily Formed Network Group—Katrina 
The Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Hastily Formed Network (HFN) team 
received a request from the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide critical 
communications services. As the deployment unfolded the HFN team demonstrated the 
capability to rapidly create wireless connectivity and Internet access in austere 
conditions. They were initially given a mission to report to Stennis Space Station 
Mississippi, as part of the Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF Katrina) to restore satellite 
communication to the Naval Oceanography Center (NAVO), a tenant command on the 
base. On September 3, 2005, the NPS team was reassigned to the Hancock County 
Mississippi Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The new mission was to reconnect 
these regions and to provide satellite-Internet connectivity for local hospital, local 
government, first responders, and the general public. The NPS-led team, with notable 
support from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Networks and Information 
Integration (OASD-NII) and private industry (Cisco, Redline, and Mercury Data 
Systems), “created the first and only official publicly accessible set of broadband wireless 
hotspot clouds in an area that virtually suffered 100% disruption of all communications 
capabilities.”225  
Within 5 hours of NPS’s equipment reaching the first site that the EOC 
requested help with (Hancock County Memorial Hospital) the 
NPS/Vendor team had satellite broadband Internet, email, VoIP, and web 
access available for myriad agencies that had set up for emergency 
operations in the hospital parking lot (including FEMA, Federal Protective 
Service, Florida Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT), National 
Guard Emergency Medical Unit, National Guard Security Unit, Disaster 
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Mortuary Team (DMORT), regional ambulance service providers, and the 
hospital staff.226  
The NPS team worked from the Hancock Medical Center and expanded the network 
outwards linking centers of response together (see Figure 6).  
The networks and the communications capabilities are the beginning of pockets of 
local order (PoLO).227 PoLO is a concept to explain how systems and processes organize 
in time and space to perform some function.228 The social organization had been 
extremely disrupted and a communication system provides the substance and processes 
for self-organization. The ability to use technology to communicate creates virtual PoLO, 
affecting emergent and convergent interaction, coordination and organization. The 
increased flow of information will create challenges for interpretation, processing and 
dissemination management.229 The Internet connectivity is a key, and the ability to link 
to it provides access to a host of tools and capabilities that are far more robust then 
satellite telephones. Besides basic services (e.g., email, file sharing, voice over IP, chat 
rooms, video conferencing, crisis response management software), the Internet 
connection allows for processing and data management to be handled off site, far from 
the impacted zones. The potential power here lies in organizing and management private 
industry and the volunteer and technical community (V&TC). Sahana Software 
Foundation was founded in 2004 in response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and 
tsunami. This was an early effort of volunteer humanitarian technical volunteerism. The 
potential to utilize these services were just not available in the U.S. in 2005 as social 
media was just beginning to coalesce; a trusted network of reliable V&TC had not been 
formed. The power of these systems and organization, combined with linkages with 
private industry and with the convergent forces via functioning data network, is the 
potential that a HFN unleashes. The ability to use up to date geographical information, 
access to expert systems and databases, and connection to massive processing power is 
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the goal of a technologically modern communication system. The small NPS team was 
able to demonstrate that this was achievable.  
 
Figure 6.  HFN Katrina Network Node Locations, September 20, 2005230 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned report released 
February of 2006 clearly attributes many of the failures to lack of communication 
affecting collaboration, command and control, cooperation with local and state response, 
and logistical and operational management.231 The report recommends numerous 
improvements and the creation of a comprehensive, national emergency communications 
strategy. The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) that was released in 
2008 by DHS formulated goals for improving national emergency communications and a 
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timeline for accomplishing those goals.232 However, those goals are primarily focused on 
interoperability radios.233 In those six years, the information and technology world has 
moved on exponentially (according to Moore’s law234 this is approximately three 
lifetimes in technology). In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy devastated the northeastern 
United States and the FEMA Hurricane Sandy after action report names communication 
and coordination as significant problems in their response.235 Though communication 
was still a problem, the response was approached in a more vigorous manner.  
In the 2011 paper entitled “Resilience, Entropy, and Efficiency in Crisis 
Management: The January 12, 2010, Haiti Earthquake,” it states that resilience and 
efficiency are “largely driven by interactions among organizations participating in 
disaster operations, their exchange of timely, valid information, and their capacity for 
learning and adaptation, as well as gaps in cognition and action.”236 The majority of the 
studies focus upon the effects of communications voids on convergent forces. Decision 
making and situational awareness are crippled, and the response devolves into 
disorganization and loss of coordination and productive involvement. Stabilizing the 
social system as well as attending to environmental concerns is the real objective. 
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V. HAITI CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake rocked Haiti with catastrophic 
consequences. The small impoverished nation was severely affected: over 100,000 dead, 
massive destruction and damage to buildings (residential, business and governmental) 
and failure of fragile infrastructure. This sudden onset disaster resulted in a massive 
global humanitarian aid/disaster response (HA/DR) effort. The destruction of Haiti’s 
infrastructure (and the communication infrastructure in particular) led to a chaotic 
environment even the most basic assessments could not be trusted. The World Food 
Programme (WFP) identified 700 organizations that responded, further straining the 
coordination efforts.237 The international response community was unable to overcome 
the chaotic environment, and its communication systems and resources were soon 
overwhelmed by the massive needs and requests. The international disaster response was 
characterized as confused, uncoordinated, ill-informed, and lacking a commonly agreed 
upon leadership structure. Without a functioning communication system, the disaster 
response community was unable to develop a common operating picture (COP) to 
prioritize and organize efficient relief.  
The United Nations has had many experiences in disaster response worldwide. 
The after action reports of disasters like the earthquake in Haiti have brought about 
significant reorganization of information, communication, and technology (ICT). There is 
a revolution in worldwide network connectivity. The new technical environments pose 
new challenges and potentials. Though connectivity is a real problem, responders are 
being overwhelmed by the massive increase in information flows that are a consequence 
of the rapid increase in methods to electronically communicate.  
The ubiquity of cellular telephone ownership in even the poorest countries, the 
enormous amounts of data from new streams, and the unreasonable expectations of 
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immediacy in a wired world are all overwhelming a process that is essentially limited by 
the abilities and capacity of the human component. The disaster response workers are 
inundated with requests for assistance (directly from the affected communities via 
cellular phones).  
The problem is the current methods rely on a workflow that is ancient. Humans 
must read the report, verify, and distill the important data and then efficiently distribute 
it. Modern ICT provides enhanced functionality, and it is a source of information 
overload. The increase in data has not translated into a corresponding increase in human 
information processing capacity. Connectivity unleashes the potential benefits of 
distributed computational power, crowdsourcing, data modeling, and multitudes of 
globally connected volunteers. A massive volume of data from multiple inputs 
overwhelms responders’ ability to process.238  
The UN experiences in Haiti and the assessment of the information management 
issues serve as excellent models for domestic initiatives directed at domestic crisis 
response. Failures of ITC support in Haiti in the first three weeks had far-ranging 
negative effects throughout both the response and recovery phases.239 The data from the 
network analysis points to a response network that was fragmented, organizations that 
were isolated, information sharing that was inhibited, and the emergent forces were not 
engaged. 
International humanitarian response often demonstrates problems in 
communication that are more severe than those experienced domestically. In this 
situation, there are far more agencies from many countries, from diverse cultural 
backgrounds, speaking many languages, with objectives or political goals that can be 
incongruent. The challenges of this communications environment are staggering.  
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B. THE CHALLENGES TO ITC IN HUMANITARIAN AID AND DISASTER 
RESPONSE 
The UN HA/DR response to Haiti encountered a catastrophe. Conditions included 
severely damaged infrastructure, local government in disarray, and an inability to access 
common data and information that would assist in prioritizing primary humanitarian 
tasks. The staff and locations housing essential information like maps identifying roads, 
locations of hospitals, demographics, locations and types of development programs that 
were underway, were all part of the disaster.240 Haiti had one working airport, a severely 
damaged port, harsh environmental conditions, over 100,000 dead or dying, and hundreds 
of thousands without access to basic needs (i.e., food, water, shelter). This was the 
situation the international community faced. Its response proved to be one of the biggest 
humanitarian aid operations in history. Those tasked with facilitating communications 
had to first reestablish basic connectivity. As connectivity improved, issues with 
management of information led to sluggish coordination, an inability to collaborate, and 
the creation of information gaps that hampered damage assessment and response 
planning. 
The UN identified four major causes that contributed to an overloaded crisis 
communications system that was unable to fill the communication gaps to improve 
response efficiency (see Figure 7): 
1. The UN cluster system that was designed to organize the response created 
unforeseen obstacles to information sharing.  
2. The rapidly growing volunteer and technical communities (V&TC) were 
able to form some useful partnerships, but they came at a cost. 
3. The widespread ability of the affected population to communicate directly 
via mobile/wireless technology added a new data flow.  
4. The advances in modern communication technology created unrealistic 
expectations.  
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Figure 7.  Crisis Response Data Flow Diagram241 
C. EXISTING SYSTEM 
The international humanitarian response, in cooperation with the host country, 
required the development of a coherent and realistic COP. Field managers consistently 
reported that they were constantly behind delivering information that was expected. The 
response efforts were unable to effectively engage local efforts. In addition, communities 
were isolated and the fragile Haitian social order had disintegrated. International efforts 
suffered from decision making based upon inaccurate or incomplete information, and 
local communities were completely isolated and in chaos.  
New technologies allow for greater quantities and faster delivery of data, but it 
does not alter the human capacity to translate data to knowledge—a phenomenon Peter 
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Denning describes as info-glut.242 Denning explained that an adverse result of info-glut is 
that workers become detached and uninvolved and lose the ability to focus.243  
This situation added to the stress of working in a disaster area that required 
unbelievable physical effort. Three types of issues commonly emerged from post disaster 
interviews: 
• “Structural issues: Aspects of the information management design used by 
the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)-led cluster system that 
restricted information flows within and between clusters. 
• Lack of resources: Overreliance on underfunded and understaffed 
information management units. 
• Delays: Delays in information flows due to translation, collation, and 
analysis.”244  
The cluster system is designed to promote coordination between organizations 
based on functional needs and substantive areas of response. Ideally, each organization 
and cluster would provide ICT support and assist communication efforts across various 
clusters. The lead agency for each cluster would be responsible for ensuring that 
information management is coordinated and effective between clusters. However, Haiti 
revealed that ICT resources were insufficient and unable to respond in a timely manner.  
In practice, clusters worked to achieve their own goals and had little resources to 
devote to overall coordination effort. Their efforts were characterized as slow and 
unproductive. Additionally, events changed faster than weekly meeting could 
accommodate. Furthermore, information systems became fragmented, data was siloed, 
and difficult to aggregate. Consequently, organizations were unable to form a COP, and 
they were unable to adapt, thereby contributing to numerous failures in the response 
efforts.245 Although tools and technology have advanced rapidly, the human workflow 
process and actual human rate of analysis creates a bottleneck.  
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The UN analysis linked inadequate resources to failures in inter-cluster and intra-
cluster coordination. Adequate resources, which increased the reliance on human 
intervention, did not match the dramatic increase in data flows and connectivity options. 
In a harsh environment of disaster response, the field-staff, who were attempting to 
address the overwhelming needs of the affected population, also faced greater burden and 
expectation of information management. 
Information during crisis response is time sensitive, and delays alter 
understanding of perceived needs, resources, or goals. Some delays (e.g., from 
translation) were expected. For example, the delay created by translating documents and 
messages between English, French, and Creole. The UN was unable to keep up with the 
translation needs. Although this would have been an excellent opportunity to outsource, 
this time consuming task to trusted V&TC. The UN response community had no formal 
manner to enlist V&TC, translations were of uneven quality and generally disregarded 
(unless it came from a trusted source).  
Although using V&TC mapping, messaging and text tracking and positive 
connectivity collaboration with Télécoms Sans Frontières, proved successful. There were 
no formalized procedures to vet, interact or evaluate the information flow or any pre-
operation relationships with new and often ad-hoc V&TC. The groups that were 
successful were those that had established relationships with responders prior to the 
disaster.246  
The international response suffered from inability to restore a 
communications system. The system that emerged was not an effective 
network and did little to engage the affected communities. The ICT assets 
were inadequate for a catastrophic response and were directed to support 
the desperate needs of the clusters leads. The experienced UN crisis 
response planners had made significant plans to address communications 
gaps but the strategy suffered from inadequate ICT resources, unforeseen 
data flow increases and a failure to address communications as a system. 
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D. HASTILY FORMED NETWORK GROUP—HAITI 
The NPS HFN Center was contacted to deploy to Haiti as part of the Joint Forces 
Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and later the Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF 
Haiti). The NPS team had previously worked with the JFMCC during deployments to 
Katrina (in 2005) and the tsunami in southeast Asia (in 2004). From the U.S. Navy 
hospital ship (USNS) Comfort (T-AH-20) the team (seven members) “was directed to 
support and provide advice (and communications capability as we brought a fair amount 
of SATCOM/MESHED WIFI/WIMAX and alternate power equipment with us).”247 
From the beginning, the NPS team found communication as both the “biggest obstacle 
and the biggest enabler.”248 Larry Wentz, a senior research fellow at the National 
Defense University, observed, “most responders agree ICT is important in helping save 
lives and to help coordinate relief efforts but few treat it as an essential service beyond 
meeting their own needs.”249 The NPS team began work from the USNS Comfort and 
gradually expanded the scope of its mission and the diameter of its HFN network.  
The team began work to address the urgent need for communication in an 
extremely chaotic and hazardous environment. For the first 10–15 days, there was an 
inability to acquire solid information, develop any sort of situational awareness, or share 
information due to massive degradation of the communication infrastructure.250 As the 
NPS-team began to expand its network using satellite based Internet services, it found 
that web based information portals, social networks, and collaboration tools were 
popularly used.251 The team found that Skype (a messaging software that allows voice-
over-IP, instant messaging, and video conferencing) was an excellent collaboration tool. 
Brian Steckler was able to start an ad-hoc and informal chat group of global subject 
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matter experts (SME); this ability strengthened social links and increased trusted 
relationships. 
The NPS team pushed out and augmented network and connectivity from the U.S. 
Coast Guard port facilities (see Figure 8). During the deployment, the team traveled on 
assessment reconnaissance to ascertain the status of communication.252 One of these trips 
led to successfully assisting the Haitian Community Hospital of Petionville. The hospital 
was basically overwhelmed and unable to communicate urgent needs for either UN or 
U.S. military assistance. Wentz found that an overall communications plan to connect the 
healthcare sector was missing and efforts appeared ad-hoc.253 The team supported the 
hospitals communication efforts. These efforts were without direct order but reflected the 
distributed command structure within a chaotic environment.  
In the post event analysis, the NPS HFN team found problems integrating into a 
complex international response. The technical problems ranged from a lack of 
interoperability, poor-information sharing, severe challenges to collaboration, and an 
acute need for comprehensive process that addresses communication holistically. The 
NPS team led efforts to untangle the conflict caused by organizations not prepared to 
manage frequencies. Developing frequency plans was an unforeseen problem, and the 
consequences were that the communication hardware was constantly interfering with 
each other.254 Consistently, the most valuable commodity was bandwidth; there never 
seemed to be enough. The chaotic communications environment reflected a 
misunderstanding of the essential nature of communication to successful response.  
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VI. RESPONSE NETWORK ANALYSIS  
A. NETWORK ANALYSIS  
During Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Haiti, the networks that evolved 
and emerged had significant structural problems. The common criticism of the crisis 
response was an inability to create a functional communication system in a timely 
manner. The result was a response that has been characterized as unable develop SA or 
COP (that had severe effects on decision making), an inability to engage the affected 
population, and plagued by poor coordination. The lack of an overall communications 
strategy led to a network evolution that was ad-hoc without meaningful ICT intervention 
by the convergent forces.  
Social network analysis (SNA) is a method of analysis utilizing network theory on 
social networks, illustrating the relationships that link nodes (organizations) to each 
other. Using SNA, complex network maps are created and statistical tools provide an 
understanding of network behavior, relationships, and patterns. These measures reveal 
topographical and organizational patterns such as connectivity, centrality, influence, and 
efficiency. A catastrophic event is primarily a disruption to the social network and 
society’s response to that disruption. Examining the dynamics of social networking of 
response organizations provides an understanding of the evolutionary process of a 
communications system. The SNA data examined shows networks that are disconnected 
and unable to engage responding organizations or effectively link the affected population. 
1. Katrina Response Network Data 
The analysis of Hurricane Katrina networks relies on three studies and the 
corresponding datasets. The data measured network formation during the initial response 
period. The authors of the studies kindly provided access to the datasets, or the data was 
publically available. The studies were:  
 72 
• Carter Butts, Ryan Acton, and Christopher Marcum, “Interorganizational 
Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response” (data publicly 
available)256 
• Louise K. Comfort at the Universty of Pittsburgh, Center for Disaster 
Management 
• Naim Kapucu at the Department of Public Administration, University of 
Central Florida 
 
2. Katrina Response Network 
The three studies each use different data acquisition, coding, and modeling 
methods. The different methodologies led to a significant difference in the numbers of 
organizations involved, definition of node or link, and the length of time studied. The 
data collection and analysis approaches are detailed in Appendix A. However, the studies 
are in agreement that the crisis network that emerges had significant topological problems 
that inhibited the flow of information. The network was unable to provide an effective 
communications system in a timely manner. A communication system is “most effective 
when information management is linked to information exchange and social 
communication techniques and processes.”257 The Katrina networks did not build the 
links and establish the relationships to create a functional network and were unable to 
share information efficiently. 
Using the data three studies that tracked network dynamics using social network 
analysis of the emergent Katrina network the following patterns develop: 
• Networks were highly fragmented and loosely coupled. 
• The fragmentation continued at a high rate for an extended period. 
• The majority of participating organizations operated in isolation 
and were unable to share information.  
 
 
                                                 
256 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response.” 
257 Susana A. Barrantes, Martha Rodriguez, and Ricardo Pérez, eds., Information Management and 
Communication in Emergencies and Disasters: Manual for Disaster Response Teams (Washington, DC: 
Pan American Health Organization, 2009), http://www.paho.org/disasters/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=644&Itemid=879&lang=en  
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• A giant central component (sub-network) emerged.  
• This component evolved following the model of Barabási and 
Reka model for scale-free network.258  
• The central component was overwhelming populated with 
convergent organizations. 
• These organizations had access to stable communications systems. 
• The giant component follows natural network evolution. Network 
growth is not managed.  
• Lack of emergent engagement 
• The majority of reported participating organizations are 
categorized as local (municipal, city, county/parish, and state). 
• The sub-networks that are identified reflect dominance by 
convergent organizations. 
 
B. KATRINA ORGANIZATIONS  
The three studies use different methodologies that track participation of 
organizations or groups over time. Table 2 illustrates the number of organizations and the 











                                                 
258 Barabási, and Réka “Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks.”  
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Table 2.   Hurricane Katrina Participating Agencies 
 






Kapucu, Arslan, & 
Collins261 
8/25-9/25 
Organizations Breakdown Percentage 
International 8.3 3.7 ------- 
Federal 17.1 31.4 9 
Regional 2.9 6.2 ------- 
Interstate 1.3 ------- ------- 
State 38 17 27 
Sub-Regional ------ 6.2 ------- 
County 10 13.6 23 
Local 15.7 21.9 11 
City 5.7 ------- ------- 
Non-Profit ------- ------- 14 
Private ------- ------- 16 
Total Percentage 100262 100 100 
Numbers of 
Organizations 1577 535 580 
 
The data shows a majority of organizations involved to be in from the local to the 





                                                 
259 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response.”  
260 Comfort and Haase, “Communication, Coherence, and Collective Action. 
261 Naim Kapucu, Tolga Arslan, and Matthew L. Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and 
Interorganizational Response to Catastrophic Disasters: Toward a Network-Centered Approach,” 
Administration & Society 42, no. 2 (2010): 222–247.  
262 Addition of 1.1 percent of data missing jurisdictional equals 100 percent. Butts, Acton, and 
Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response,” 8.  
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Table 3.   Hurricane Katrina Participating Agencies—Local Agencies 
Local Response Percentage 
Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins263 61.0 
Comfort and Haase264 58.0 
Butts, Acton, and Marcum265 69.4 
 
C. NETWORK DISCONNECTION 
At its most basic level, a crisis response network needs to be able to pass 
information between the participating organizations. The emerging network was heavily 
fragmented and loosely linked during the period studied. It displays high isolates counts 
(organizations without links), high levels of fragmentation (few connected sub-networks), 
and low levels of network centralization.266  
Viewing a static network map of the Katrina response networks is deceptive. The 
aggregate static map (that tracks all interactive links throughout the studies) shows a 
large, well-connected network (Figure 9). It is essential to view the maps dynamically. 
The dynamic network maps in Appendix A clarifies the disconnected nature of the 
network over time. 
                                                 
263 Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational.”   
264 Comfort and Haase, “Communication, Coherence, and Collective Action.”  
265 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response.” 
266 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response;” 
Comfort and Haase, “Communication, Coherence, and Collective Action;” Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, 
“Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response;” Scheinert, and Konstantinova, 
“Attempting a Knowledge Commons in the Field.”    
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Figure 9.  Diagram of Network Interaction Hurricane Katrina August 27 to 
September 19, 2005267 
D. NETWORK FRAGMENTATION 
Using the Butts, Acton, and Marcum data,268 a network fragmentation chart 
illustrates the percentage of network fragmentation over time (see Figure 10). This chart 
demonstrates that the majority of organizations were isolated during the response to 
Hurricane Katrina and that this fragmentation remained high. The network expands 
rapidly in the study, but the percentage “generally fluctuates around the mean of 
67.34%.”269 The result is that information sharing was extremely restricted and inhibited. 
Figure 18 illustrates the steady state of non-isolate components (sub-networks) through 
the study. The maximum size of the largest component reached 219 organizations out of 
                                                 
267 See Appendix A for legend of organization included in network analysis. Comfort and Haase, 
“Communication, Coherence, and Collective Action.”  
268 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response.” 
269 Ibid.  
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775 identified organizations on September 4, 2005.270 As the response efforts expanded 
(the increase in number of participating organizations), the new organizations 
participating were unable to establish links. Those organizations that were linked had 
limited access to new sources of information. One large sub-network emerges surrounded 
by smaller disconnected sub-networks and isolated organizations (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 10.  Hurricane Katrina: Network Fragmentation August 24 to September 
5, 2005 (2012 Dataset)271 
                                                 
270 Ibid.  
271 Ibid.  
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Figure 11.  Hurricane Katrina: Non-Isolate Components August 24 to September 
5, 2005 (2012 Dataset)272 
E. CENTRALITY—DEGREE, CLOSENESS, BETWEENNESS 
Centrality is regarded as one of the most important and commonly used 
conceptual tools for exploring actor roles in social networks. The number of links to an 
actor is degree centrality. By definition, the “central actors must be the most active in the 
sense that they have the most ties to other actors in the network or graph.”273 Centrality is 
a conceptual tool that examines the roles and characteristics of actors (organizations) 
within a network. The degree centrality measures the number of links of an actor in 
comparison to the total number of links possible in a network. Organizations with the 
most links have the higher degree of centrality. This measure is often a rough measure of 
an organization’s influence within the network. Table 4 presents mean degree centrality 
                                                 
272 Ibid.  
273 Stanley Wasserman, and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications 













and network centralization. From the Butts, Acton, and Marcum data,274 average degree 
centrality can be seen to remain low for the network over the span of the study (see 
Figure 12). The data from all three studies find a network that on average has few links 
per node and that network centralization values point to a loosely coupled network.275 
Table 4.   Hurricane Katrina Mean Degree Centrality and Network 
Centralization 
Data Set Degree Network 
Centralization 
Kapucu, Arslan, and 
Collins276 
1.821 14.22 
Comfort and Haase277 2.422 15.96 




                                                 
274 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response.” 
275 Note: Full descriptive statistics is in Appendix A. for each study. Butts, Acton, and Marcum, 
“Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response;” Comfort and Haase, 
“Communication, Coherence, and Collective Action;” Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining 
Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response.”   
276 Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response.”   
277 Comfort and Haase, “Communication, Coherence, and Collective Action.” 
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Figure 12.  Hurricane Katrina Average Degree Centrality August 24 to 
September 5, 2005 (2012 Dataset)278 
In analyzing the degree centrality, the difference of the data collection methods 
displays some interesting variances. Comfort and Haase identified eight organizations 
with the highest degree centrality (FEMA, National Guard, president of the United States, 
governor of Louisiana, New Orleans Police Department, local hospitals, government of 
Jefferson Parish, and Mayor of New Orleans).279 The majority of these agencies are 
within the affected region. The Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins data280 reflects greater 
degree centrality of convergent forces but still the majority of organizations with a high 
degree centrality are from the affected area (see Table 5). The data is at odds with the 
Butts, Acton, and Marcum study281 in Table 6; nine of the top 10 organizations are 
outside the affected regions (convergent forces). The explanation lies in the data 
                                                 
278 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response.” 
279 Comfort and Haase, “Communication, Coherence, and Collective Action.” 
280 Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response.”   
281 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response.” 
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collection methods. The data from Comfort and Haase study282 was acquired from 
content analysis of news reported from the Times-Picayune (the major newspaper of New 
Orleans). This data set was constructed from participating organizations operating within 
the affected area. The Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins (2010) data283 was acquired through 
content analysis of a wider variety of sources (for a full description see Appendix A). In 
2012, the Butts, Acton, and Marcum study284 identified 1577 operating organizations 
through analysis of 63 source organizations. This study represents a far larger data 
collection effort (for a full description see Appendix A). This study found that 
“organizations having considerable prior experience with disasters and/or with advanced 
disaster preparedness measures and infrastructure in place tend to dominate the list of 
high-degree actors.”285 
Table 5.   Organizations’ Highest Degree Centrality286 
Organizations Degree 
Florida State Emergency Response team 84 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 67 
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) 51 
Florida 48 
American Red Cross (ARC) 41 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 37 
Alabama 33 
Alabama Emergency Management Agency (ALEMA) 26 
Mississippi 23 
Louisiana 21 
                                                 
282 Comfort and Haase, “Communication, Coherence, and Collective Action.” 
283 Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response.”   
284 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response.” 
285 Ibid., 19.  
286 Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response,” 
235.    
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Table 6.   Ten Highest Central Degree Organizations287 
Organizations Degree 
Colorado Division of Emergency Management (DEM) 45 
American Red Cross 41 
Texas State Operations Center 36 
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 30 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 27 
Georgia State Operations Center   27 
Dry Tortugas/Everglades National Park  26 
Florida SERT, Emergency Support Service Branch 25 
Alabama EMA, Emergency Operations Center, ESF 9  23 
Missouri Emergency Management Agency (EMA) 23 
 
F. CLOSENESS AND BETWEENNESS 
Closeness and betweenness centrality describes an actor’s position within a 
network structure. These metrics are not as useful on an uncoupled network with high 
fragmentation. The Butts, Acton, and Marcum data288 displays a giant component (sub-
network). Using closeness and betweenness that giant component can be better 
understood as a functional response network. The metrics describe a network that 
conforms to network theories on network evolution. 
Closeness centrality measures that can identify actors that are best suited to pass 
information in a network.289 The closeness of an actor is a measure of its path length to 
other actors compared to all other actors.290 An actor with a low closeness score reflects 
shorter paths to other actors, increasing the likelihood of information sharing. This 
                                                 
287 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response,” 
12.  
288 Ibid.   
289 Wasserman, and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis, 49.  
290 Linton C. Freeman, “Centrality in Social Networks. Conceptual Clarification,” Social Networks 1, 
no. 3 (1979): 215–239.  
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calculation measures network efficiency, a network with actors that are far from each 
other have difficulty sharing information.291 A problem with closeness is that a highly 
fragmented network will not provide closeness centrality measures that are useful. 
Isolated actors do not have a path to other actors. The isolated actor data needs to be 
eliminated for closeness centrality measurements. The resulting components are 
examined and the centrality metrics (closeness, betweenness) can be used to determine 
the sub-network behavior and structure. 
All three studies identify a large component of connected actors within the 
fragmented network. A comparison of the closeness measures for the three studies are in 
Appendix A. The studies agree that the high-level fragmentation made closeness 
centrality irrelevant for the entire network. Both the Comfort and Hasse study and the 
Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins study show a “very high mean” measure for “farness,” 
farness means that actors do not have short path lengths to share information. The 
network is unconnected so no measure of network centralization can be calculated.292 
This lack of connectivity displayed results in difficulty of crisis response organizations in 
coordinating activities. 
The Butts, Acton, and Marcum study examines the level of closeness within the 
giant component that emerges.293 The giant component is the largest sub-network within 
the whole network. This emerging component represents a cluster of organizations that 
forms ties and can achieve a level of information sharing and collaboration that is 
otherwise missing. The giant component evolves following general network formation 
characteristic that resemble a scale-free network.294  
                                                 
291 Steve P. Borgatti, “Centrality and Network Flow,” Social Networks 27, no. 1 (2005): 55–71.  
292 Comfort and Haase, “Communication, Coherence, and Collective Action,” 10;   
293 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response;” 
Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response,” 234.  
294 Barabási, and Réka, “Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks;” Barabási, Linked: The New 
Science of Networks.  
 84 
G. GIANT COMPONENT 
In Katrina, the emerging network displayed the mechanisms that govern network 
evolution: growth, preferential attachment, and attachment related to fitness.295 Using the 
Butts, Acton, and Marcum data,296 the aggregate network follows a power law 
distribution (see Figure 13). Hubs evolution and popularity (greatest number of links) 
exhibits the characteristics of a scale-free network. A large central component (sub-
network) emerged that reflected linkage based on a physical location, access to ICT, 
existing relationships, task-related factors, and organizational lines.297 In addition, actors 
that had high levels of centrality and acted as bridges (actors with highest measure of 
closeness), and they were headquartered and conducting business outside the affected 
areas with access to undamaged ICT resources.298 The giant component was almost 
exclusively made up of convergent forces. The data suggests that the convergent forces 
were unable to engage the affected communities or develop ties to emergent groups. The 
Katrina response forces had significant ICT assets and trained personnel but did not have 
a plan or strategy to intervene aggressively and to restore a communication network 
rapidly.  
 
                                                 
295 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response;” 
Barabási, Linked: The New Science of Networks.  
296 Butts, Acton, and Marcum, “Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response.”  
297 Ibid.  
298 Ibid., 22.  
 85 
 
Figure 13.  Hurricane Katrina Hub Formation299 
The actors who successfully linked into the response network were those in a 
greatly favored position. The missing component of this response was a strategy that 
sought to gain control of the disrupted socio-technical communication system. The data 
shows that the network was fragmented, and actors isolated for an extended period. That 
the level of fragmentation remained high even as the response grew rapidly. The greatest 
number of response actors could be defined as local. The Butts, Acton, and Marcum 
data300 illustrates that the actors converging from outside the affected regions had a far 
greater chance of establishing links and share information. These actors made up a sub-
network (giant component) that behaved according to network theory. The majority of 
actors unable to establish links were the affected communities and emergent groups that 
are such essential to restoring stability to the social system.  
                                                 
299 Ibid.  
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H. HAITI NETWORK ANALYSIS 
The data from the Haiti response illustrates the lack of engagement of emergent 
groups and the affected communities. The data from the University of Pittsburgh studies 
tracked organizational interaction over a three-week period from the onset of the event. 
The networks created in the studies have a high level of fragmentation and a high degree 
of disconnectedness.301 The response network that evolved suffered high number of 
isolated organizations, and a network that structurally had severe difficulty sharing 
information. Additionally, the resultant network suffered from poor coordination and a 
lack of efficiency. A large, well-connected sub-network (giant component) formed 
similar to the Katrina studies. The data reflects a disconnection between organizational 
planning and the reality of crisis response. The UN OCHA occupies an organizational 
and management position as the leader and coordinator of the 13 functional clusters. Data 
from the studies demonstrate that centrality and hub formation conformed to fitness 
attributes and preferential attachment. The inner sub-network grew as organizations 
converged on the affected region, but it was unable to link rapidly to organizations that 
were not established partners in the region or part of the international response 
communities. The cluster approach depends heavily upon the voluntary coordination and 
self-organization of the affect nation. The studies note a complete lack of linkage with 
local organizations.302 
The analysis of the response networks from the earthquake in Haiti relies on the 
data from studies from the University of Pittsburgh, Center for Disaster Management 
(CDM). The CDM studies use two primary data acquisition methods and are 
differentiated as groups A and B. The studies in the A group uses three types of data over 
a three-week period following the event: 
• “Content analysis of daily news reports—tracking organizational 
participation. 
• Documentary reports of organizational action from governmental and 
professional sources. 
                                                 
301 Comfort, and Okada, “Emergent Leadership in Extreme Events,” 63.   
302 Ibid., 67.  
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 On-site semi-structured interviews with responsible managers.”303 
The content analysis relies heavily upon Caribbean News Online (CANA) and is 
not the definitive “analysis of network organization.”304 The data reflects regional views 
and reporting content. Data gleaned from a content analysis of the New York Times 
presents distinctly different results.305 
The Group B studies utilize the Group A data combined with an analysis of the 
situation reports published by 11 different organizations from ReliefWeb.306 A more 
detailed description of the data collection and analysis approaches is in Appendix B. 
 
Group A 
1. Comfort, Louise K., Siciliano, Michael D., and Okada, Aya. “Resilience, 
Entropy, and Efficiency in Crisis Management: The January 12, 2010, Haiti 
Earthquake.” 2011.  
2. Comfort, Louise K., Siciliano, Michael D., and Okada, Aya. “Evolving 
Systems in Crisis Management: The January 12, 2010, Haiti Earthquake.” 
2012.  
3. Comfort, Louise K. and Okada, Aya. “Emergent Leadership in Extreme 
Events: A Knowledge Commons for Sustainable Communities.” 2013.  
Group B 
1. Scheinert, Steve and Konstantinova, Ralitsa. “Attempting a Knowledge 
Commons in the Field: the Response to the January 12th, 2010 Haitian 
Earthquake.” 2011.  
2. Siciliano, Michael “The Use of Exponential Random Graph Models to 
Investigate the Micro-Level Processes of Inter-Organizational Network 
Formation.” 2011.  
                                                 
303 Louise K. Comfort, Michael D. Siciliano, and Aya Okada, “Evolving Systems in Crisis: The 
January 12, 2010 Haiti Earthquake,” in Mega-crises: Understanding the Prospects, Nature, 
Characteristics, and the Effects of Cataclysmic Events, ed. Ira Helsloot et al. (77–91) (Springfield, IL: 
Charles C Thomas, Publisher, 2012), 80.  
304 CANA—Major Caribbean regional print and broadcast media outlet. Comfort, Siciliano, and 
Okada, “Evolving Systems in Crisis.”   
305 Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, “Evolving Systems in Crisis.”   
306 ReliefWeb: largest portal for humanitarian information sharing. The portal is administered by UN 
OCHA. 
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I. HAITI ORGANIZATIONS 
Scheniert and Konstantinova document nearly 700 participating organizations 
using data from the Sahana Foundation.307 Louise Comfort, Michael Siciliano, and Aya 
Okada tracked organizational interactions and participation utilizing a content search of 
the Caribbean News Online (CANA).308 The response network found was primarily 
composed of international organizations.309 The data also reflects an almost total lack of 
linkage to affected communities (see Table 7). The emergent efforts are difficult to track 
the missing data, and the official reports demonstrate an inability to link the affected 
communities in a timely manner. 
Table 7.   Distributions of Organizations Participating in the Haiti Response310 
 
 
J. NETWORK DISCONNECTED 
Similar to the Hurricane Katrina, static network map the aggregated links of the 
entire study is deceptive (see Figures 14 and 15). The dynamic network maps are 
included in Appendix B, and they provide a clearer picture of network behavior and 
evolution over the time studied. The dynamic maps show a network that has a high level 
of fragmentation over an extended period for convergent actors and a lack of emergent 
connection. 
 
                                                 
307 Scheinert, and Konstantinova, “Attempting a Knowledge Commons in the Field.”  
308 Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, “Evolving Systems in Crisis.”   
309 Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, “Resilience, Entropy, and Efficiency in Crisis Management,” 11.  
310 Ibid., 9.  
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Figure 14.   Earthquake in Haiti—Static Network311 
 
 
Figure 15.  UCINet Network Map Key for Node Colors and Shapes312 
 
                                                 
311 Scheinert, and Konstantinova, “Attempting a Knowledge Commons in the Field.”  
312 Ibid.  
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K. NETWORK FRAGMENTATION 
Scheniert and Konstantinova clearly demonstrate the high level of fragmentation 
within the response network (see Figure 14).313 The dips in fragmentation are a result of 
connections made at the weekly cluster meetings at the logistical base. These once a 
week meetings provided means of coordination and sharing information.314 The CDM 
reconnaissance trips to Haiti confirmed this pattern. Researchers witnessed difficulties 
sharing information, ad-hoc use of ICT, information velocity determined by paper 
processes, and human cognitive capacity.315 The result was a response network that had a 
large number of isolated organizations and high levels of fragmentation (see Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16.  Network Fragmentation, Dynamic Network316 
                                                 
313 Ibid.  
314 Ibid., 11–12.  
315 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Disaster Relief 2.0; Scheinert, and Konstantinova, “Attempting a 
Knowledge Commons in the Field,” 11–12.   
316 Scheinert, and Konstantinova, “Attempting a Knowledge Commons in the Field,” 9.  
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L. CENTRALITY 
The analysis of degree centrality and network centralization by Louise Comfort, 
Michael Siciliano, and Aya Okada is presented in Table 8. The degree centralization is 
20.33 and indicates a loosely connected network. The normalized mean number of links 
for actors is 2.56. This measure confirms limited connectivity between actors. The 
Scheinert and Konstantinova found key organizations emerged as highly linked hubs and 
often served as bridges (see Figure 17).317 These hubs served the informational need of a 
smaller sub-network (giant component) but due to the high number of isolates, the overall 
network had severe barriers to information flow.318 The Haiti response network shows 
similarities to the Katrina network. The high isolate counts and fragmentation combined 
with highly clustered sub-network. Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada found the high 
clustering ratio to the distance ratio represented a small-world network within the larger 
system (Table 9).319 A small-world network is a natural occurring feature of large real-
world networks. This feature results in a number of large clusters with small linkage 
paths.320 This network structure can be a source of efficiency for those actors with links 
to the clusters. Conversely, the high fragmentation rate means the large network is unable 
to cooperate effectively and coordinate. This reflects a communications system that was 
not managed at a strategic or tactical level. Modern ICT provides inexpensive access to 
advanced network monitoring and management tools. A communication strategy in crisis 
response understands that it is essential to recreate the links (that have been disrupted) 
and that the resulting network is a dynamic system. This system needs help to grow and 
vigilant oversight of its evolutionary process. 
 
 
                                                 
317 Ibid.   
318 Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, “Evolving Systems in Crisis,” 87.  
319 Ibid.    
320 Watts, and Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” 440.  
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Table 8.   Network Centralization Descriptive Statistics321 
 
Table 9.   Small World Network within the Haiti Response System, 
January 12–February 3, 2010322 
Network Measure     
Clustering Coefficient (CANA) 
 
0.393 
Average Distance (CANA) 
 
3.251 
Average Clustering (Random Graph) 0.026 







Small World Ratio   18.168 
 
                                                 
321 Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, “Resilience, Entropy, and Efficiency in Crisis Management,” 11.  
322 Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, “Evolving Systems in Crisis,” 87.  
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Figure 17.  Most Central Organizations, Static Network323 
Under the cluster system’s official organization, the lead organizations are 
UNOCHA and the Logistics Cluster. The data show that the most central organizations in 
the response were the WASH Cluster (UNWASH) and UNICEF, closely followed by the 
World Food Program (WFP). UNOCHA only reaches a position where it is tied with 
several other organizations that are in the top ten of only 15 percent of the centrality 
measures.324 The expectation from the cluster system design would be the UN OCHA 
would be the most central organization. The data shows that organizations linked directly 
to the cluster leads (UNWASH, UNICEF, and UNWASH). UNOCHA was not central to 
managing connections, serving as an information conduit or serving as a leader inter-
organization coordination.325 This example serves to demonstrate that networks evolve 
following principles and forces that do not necessary follow design expectations. 
M. NATIONAL RESPONSE AND COMMUNICATIONS 
The National Response Framework (NRF), Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA)326 
acknowledges that there is a difference between the disasters and catastrophic events. 
However, there is not a corresponding acknowledgment that a new communications 
                                                 
323 Scheinert, and Konstantinova, “Attempting a Knowledge Commons in the Field,” 7.  
324 Ibid., 8.  
325 Ibid.   
326 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Catastrophic Incident Annex.  
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approach is needed. A review of the official response documentation displays a lack of a 
comprehensive communications strategy. The 2013 NRF acknowledges the importance 
of communication, emphasizes community engagement, but there is a gap in the crisis 
response management doctrines that describe any new organizational initiatives.327  
The National Incident Management System (NIMS)328 has not been updated since 
2008 as the technical landscape has progressed in capacity, power, and complexity. At 
the same time, Incident Command System (ICS) is turning 40 without a significant 
overhaul. In 2010, the FEMA Disaster Emergency Communications (DEC) attempted to 
alter ICS, adding DEC and MERS as a part of the Operations Section. Though tactical 
communications and an aggressive plan to assess and respond to communications is a 
good step, this is a continued splintering of the communications and information effort.  
• 2010 National Incident Management System Incident Command System 
Emergency Responder Field Operations Guide—Communication is a Unit 
in Logistics (see Figure 18) 
• 2009 Interim ICS Handbook (expires January 1, 2010)—Has DEC and 
MERS in the Operations organizational chart. This is inconsistent with 
living ICS documentation (see Figure 19).329 
                                                 
327 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework.  
328 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System.  
329 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Incident Management Handbook (FEMA B-761) 
[interim] (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/




Figure 18.  FEMA Incident Management Handbook—Organizational Chart330 
                                                 
330 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System Incident Command System Emergency Responder Field Operations 
Guide (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2010), http://montanadma.org/sites/default/files/FEMA-2009-0014-0002-1_0.pdf, 2–10.   
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Figure 19.  FEMA Interim ICS Handbook (expires January 1, 2010)—Disaster 
Emergency Communications Branch331 
The changes made from the 2009 ICS Handbook and the FEMA Interim ICS 
Handbook reflect a substantial change of the position of crisis communications. The 
interim handbook creates a branch for communications within operations.332 
Communications is still a unit within the Logistics section. The changes do not create a 
communications leadership role. DEC’s role is subordinate to the operations section 
chief, and the communications unit remains in logistics. A review of current live 
documents and the official ICS course-work offered by FEMA does not reflect that the 
interim ICS Handbook changes are official organizational policy.  
                                                 
331 Ibid.  
332 Ibid.  
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The Emergency Support Function #2 (ESF) part of the NRF serves to identify the 
organizations that have overall responsibility for communications.333 The documents 
have gone through considerable review since 2004 (see Appendix E.).  
• ESF #2 (2004) Communication the Primary Agency: DHS 
• ESF #2 (2008) Communication the Coordinating Agency: Department of 
Homeland Security/National Protection and Programs/Cybersecurity and 
Communications/National Communications System;  
• ESF #2 (2008) represents split command.  
• Primary agencies: DHS/National Protection and 
Programs/Cybersecurity and Communications/National 
Communications System Federal Emergency Management Agency 
• ESF #2 (2013) updates the 2008 but continues the split command. 
Communication the Coordinating Agency: Department of Homeland 
Security/National Protection and Programs/Cybersecurity and 
Communications;334  
• Primary agencies: DHS/National Protection and 
Programs/Cybersecurity Communications/National 
Communications System and Federal Emergency Management 
Agency 
• The whole community concept is introduced that describes vague policies 
to gain situational awareness from each responding level at the same time 
passing accurate and relevant information downward. ESF #2 also intends 
to “accomplishes this by providing assistance to stabilize and reestablish 
critical infrastructure quickly and efficiently, coordinating requests for 
additional support, identifying and integrating resources and capabilities, 
and coordinating information flow.”335 (See Appendix E.)  
• However, the NRF 2013 still has the National Communication System as 
the primary agency even though it was disbanded in 2012.  
ESF #5 part of the NRF serves to identify the organizations the agencies that have 
overall responsibility for information management. Initially, this ESF was responsible for 
emergency management. The 2013 revision represents a greater emphasis on information 
management as the primary focus. The documents have gone through considerable 
review since 2004 (see Appendix E.).  
                                                 
333 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #2.  
334 Ibid.   
335 Ibid.   
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• ESF #5 (2004) Emergency Management the Primary Agency: FEMA336 
• ESF #5 (2008) Emergency Management the Primary Agency: FEMA337 
• ESF #5 (2013) Information and Planning the Primary Agency: FEMA338 
• This update recognizes the importance of information management 
as opposed to emergency management. Information management 
and communications are defined by separate organizational 
structures. The natural fit is for communications and information to 
be closely tied. Information and communication do not necessarily 
need to be conjoined. However, a comprehensive set of 
communications and information management strategies are 
naturally complementary. Combining the two functions may be 
unwieldy but the common synergistic energy, the emphasis on ICT 
and interconnection of those functions would suggest integration as 
a preferred answer. This does not address the political barriers that 
such an organizational alteration entails. 
• NIMS (2008) elevated communications without making serious structural 
changes to ICS or create and overall crisis communications strategy. It has 
not been updated since 2008.339 
• National Emergency Communication Plan updated in 2014—not reviewed 
for this study. 
• National Level Exercise—2011—dedicated to catastrophic response 
focused on interoperability and redundant communications. These were 
tested, but the communications system was assumed stable for the 
exercise. 
The official documentation that describes domestic crisis response lacks an 
overall communications strategy. The communications and information management 
resources and personnel are fragmented. Domestic response planners do appreciate the 
importance of communication and the essential assistance required from emergent 
groups, but there is little to guide future response to attaining these objectives. The 
updates to the NRF and ESF #2 and #5 in 2013 name the “whole community” as a crucial 
                                                 
336 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #5 Emergency 
Management, 2004, http://www.usda.gov/documents/ESF05.pdf  
337 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #5 Emergency 
Management, 2008, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-05.pdf  
338 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #5 Emergency 
Management, 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1913-25045-9548/
final_esf_5_information_and_planning_20130501.pdf  
339 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System.  
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component of crisis response. There are several programs that appear to engage and assist 
the organization of emergent forces (notably the FEMA Community Emergency 
Response Program (CERT)). However, there does not exist a strategy, the ICT resources 
have not been significantly enhanced, and there has been no significant alteration of ICS. 
The National Level Exercise (NLE) 2011 after action report prepared by FEMA 
identified the first point as communications.340 FEMA found strengths in satellite 
communications established between counties, state, and FEMA whole community 
engagement as well as private sector and NGO engagement. The weaknesses found were 
resource gaps, whole community engagement (namely lack of a formal mechanism for 
engagement), and policy and planning.341 However, the participants did not use 
communications sections of the scenario.342 The participants demonstrated an ability to 
use alternative methods of communication and then assumed communications were 
stable. As the case studies demonstrate the communication system during catastrophe 
continued to be unstable for an extended period and the networks that evolved were 
structurally incapable of efficiently sharing information and integrating the emergent 
groups with convergent response. The NLE 2011 is six years after Katrina and a year 
after Haiti but demonstrates that communications are not understood to be a foundational 
system and a strategic priority. 
 
                                                 
340 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Level Exercise 2011 (NLE 11) Functional 
Exercise -Final After Action Report (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011), 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/FEMA-NLE2011-AAR.pdf    
341 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Level Exercise 2011, 2–4.  
342 Ibid., 14–15.  
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VII. FINDINGS 
The case studies found the catastrophic response systems both displayed critical 
communications failures. This failure by two distinctively different response systems 
displays a commonality. Both systems lack a comprehensive strategic communications 
plan. The communications efforts supported response functions (i.e., operations, 
planning, logistics, administration) and the needs of the organizations involved.  
No plans were in place to rapidly restore communications in the affected 
communities. Additionally, there was no plan to manage network evolution. The network 
analysis demonstrates that events, organizational position, needs, and ICT capacity drove 
linkage within the emerging response networks.  
A communications system requires a mechanism for linkage. The links define the 
emergent response network. The network analysis showed that the emerging response 
networks were structurally unsound. A majority of organizations were isolated, and the 
isolation rate remained high for the length of the study. Without links, a network is 
incapable of sharing information, making correct decisions, or effectively coordinating a 
massive inter-organizational response. The non-isolated sub-networks did behave 
following network theory principles. The findings indicate that the participants of these 
networks and their ability to link to other actors followed theories on network evolution 
(growth, preferential attachment, and fitness attributes). The affected communities were 
not actively reconnected as part of any official plan, and this inhibited self-organization. 
The Haiti response was five years after Katrina and the same problems are 
experienced. However, the march of technological progress has uncovered new obstacle 
to effective communication. The increase reliance on ICT and the ubiquitous usage of 
cell phones have led to an exponential growth of incoming data flows. A modern 
communications system requires the resources to manage this ever-increasing deluge. 
Communication disruption is a continual problem in crisis response, so much so 
that it has almost become an acceptable environmental factor in the response community. 
However, the NPS HFN teams have demonstrated that crisis communications systems 
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within the affected communities can be achieved with minimal personnel and equipment 
costs.  
The communications unit remains buried in the Logistic Section. The ESF #2 has 
two primary agencies that do not necessarily have the same goal.343 FEMA is the primary 
agency for ESF #5, but the information functions are more naturally a synergistic fit for a 
new overall information and communication technology function. ICS also needs to 
create a new Communications Section. This section chief would be part of the ICS 
general staff, have a voice in an overall strategy and have the ability to pursue goals other 
than support for other sections. This section would be responsible for the implementation 
of a comprehensive communications strategy.  
It is important to realize this thesis is about crisis response, communication, and 
that it uses data from two historic case studies. There are substantial differences between 
international and domestic response. The common problems identified in the case studies 
is the failure implement a comprehensive communications strategy. Two different 
methods of organization and management with similar underlying defects. The findings 
focus on an analysis of the framework that governs communications efforts for domestic 
response.  
The changes made post-Katrina reflects the official reorganization and updates of 
the NRF and ESF from 2008 to 2013. These reveal an understanding of the importance of 
addressing communication, especially when considering the acceleration of ICT 
capabilities. However, the resources are not substantially different than those devoted to 
Katrina (the MERS detachments are relatively the same strength) while continuing to 
fragment the ICT efforts. There is some criticism of ICS as an organization structure that 
has problems dealing with catastrophic events. The recommendation of rapid technology 
assessment teams (RTAT) is a solution that potentially allows flexibility, adaption, and 
decentralized organization within the overall hierarchical structure. These small units 
would be deployed in the impacted zones to acquire information on communications 
capabilities. An important aspect is the teams would operate autonomously; this 
                                                 
343 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #2.  
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organization represents a distributed and flexible command system. During Hurricane 
Sandy, the FEMA Disaster Emergency Communications (DEC) experimented with rapid 
assessment teams that were devoted to reconnaissance and specifically addressed 
communications gaps. These teams were successful in coordinating communications 
efforts and were a step in the right direction.344 The use of these teams are not officially 




                                                 
344 Kielty, and MacLean, “We Know You Can Hear Us.”  
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VIII. RECOMMENDATION  
A. COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY 
Crisis response planning requires the adoption of an effective communications 
strategy. This strategy must (i) address complexity; (ii) identify the role communications 
serves as a mechanism to control chaos; (iii) foster self-organization; (iv) integrate the 
social forces that emerge and converge during a catastrophic event; (v) manage network 
evolution; and the expected deluge of data. 
This strategy could achieve these objectives by incorporating: 
1. Rapid deployment of ICT teams to assess technical environment and to 
share trusted information with converging forces. 
2. Hastily formed networks teams to connect with forwardly deployed 
assessment teams and begin networking local areas of organization using 
advanced ICT then extend those networks. 
3. Develop a network following HFN concepts to: utilize advanced ICT 
solutions to create a network that satisfies social and technical 
communication needs. 
4. Manage the network evolution 
5. Manage information  
The strategy makes the rapid reestablishment of communications systems a 
primary objective. Utilizing small technically adept teams similar to those deployed by 
NPS would be a catalyst for network growth in the affected communities and serve an 
information bridge to converging organization. The linked communities are in a better 
position to self-organize. However, there is a need for intensive network and information 
management. As seen in the Haiti response, the return of connectivity will create a 
massive influx of data. Lastly, the network itself needs careful management. The control 
of ICT assets and bandwidth management would be effective management tools. There is 
a need to develop techniques that effectively track dynamic network evolution. Future 
research could be directed towards developing tracking and management tools.  
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B. RAPID TECHNOLOGY AND ASSESSMENT TEAMS 
A method of controlling chaos is the introduction of small perturbations. 
Deploying small technical teams that are focused on aggressive restoration of 
communication represent small changes (perturbations) that will have nonlinear effects 
on the chaotic environment. The use of these teams requires careful pre-planning and 
extensive feedback once committed. This first wave begins the reestablishment of a 
network working from identified centers of organization and linking adjacent actors 
(organizing emergent groups).  
The goal is active engagement of emergent groups and improving the chances 
integration of convergent forces. The centers of organization and the dominant 
convergent agencies will see rapid increase of network linkage as the network grows and 
follows the forces of preferential attachment and fitness attributes. The emergence of 
hubs is an alteration of ‘orbits’ within a chaotic system. The “orbits” or hubs forms the 
basis of attraction. These basins represent local organization via a communications 
system that is aimed at restoring local order. A catastrophe over a large region will be 
broken into many localities with local gravitation to stability.  
C. ICS RECOMMENDATIONS  
One of the biggest problems for effective domestic response to disasters is the 
organization model to which federal, state, and local efforts must conform. The mandate 
explicitly ties all emergency communication plans to the National Incident Management 
Plan (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS (mandated by Congress in 
the Homeland Security Act 2002) is a national emergency response system that is used at 
all large-scale domestic emergency incidents. Domestic disaster response agencies must 
follow this strictly hierarchical complex systematic tool for command and control. 
Incident Command System (ICS) is a crisis response organization and management 
system that has been in use for more than 40 years. This system is often criticized. For 
instance, Louise K. Comfort states that this hierarchical model has proven to be unable to 
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deal with the complexity of large-scale disaster.345 Hurricane Katrina illustrates the 
communication problems that academic criticism tie to ICS inflexibility. Comfort argues 
that ICS strength relies on stable operating conditions and it is unable to respond 
effectively to the chaos of a complex disaster the size of Katrina, complicated by the 
failure of the communication infrastructure.346 According to Moynihan, “Crises are 
defined, in part, by decisional urgency (Rosenthal, t’Hart and Charles 1989, 18), and a 
little time can make a big difference in response effectiveness (Comfort 1988, 9).”347 He 
also comments, “With limited time, the Katrina network largely failed to coordinate itself 
or improve response until after terrible suffering occurred. Time is an essential ingredient 
in learning.”348 
ICS organization must acknowledge the importance of communication as a 
crucial section and should not bury it in the Logistic Section (see Figure 20). Elevating 
communications as a new section centralize information and communications technology 
(ICT) efforts, provide access to the ICS general staff, and alters the status within the ICS 
response matrix. The communications section chief has improved lines of 
communications with other section chiefs, assume information and communication 
functions that are currently spread throughout ICS. The Communications Section would 
also be better able to assemble, train, deploy, and coordinate rapid technology assessment 
teams (RTAT) applying HFN concepts. Most importantly, the Communications Section 
would be responsible for the planning and implementation of a comprehensive 
communications strategy.  
                                                 
345 Louise K. Comfort, “Crisis Management in Hindsight: Cognition, Communication, Coordination, 
and Control,” special issue, Public Administration Review (December 2007): 188–196.  
346 Ibid., 190.  
347 Moynihan, “What Makes Hierarchical Networks Succeed?,”  
348 Donald P. Moynihan, From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of Incident Command 
Systems, IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2007, http://www.rrt9.org/external/content/
document/2763/716399/1/ICS%20from%20forest%20fires%20to%20Katrina%20-%20Moynihan.pdf, 18.  
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Figure 20.  FEMA—ICS Handbook349 
Since 2005, FEMA has devoted significant effort to improving communication 
and the implementation of ICT. There has not been a corresponding reorganization with 
ICS that acknowledges the importance of communication systems or an overall 
communication strategy. The goal of a functioning communications system is to create an 
accurate situational awareness and a common operating picture, improve the ability of 
agencies to cooperate and to establish control to the response. Comfort states, “Control in 
disaster operations cannot be achieved through hierarchical measures alone.”350 The UN 
is challenging its policies and organizations in the face of revolutionary changes in ICT; 
however, FEMA has done little to challenge a system that the entire U.S. response 
community has been mandated to use. Comfort is one of many academics that call for 
changes in a “process (that) cannot function effectively on a wide scale under the rigid 
constraints imposed by the current organizational design and procedural requirements of 
the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System.”351 
                                                 
349 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System.  
350 Comfort, “Crisis Management in Hindsight,” 192.  
351 Ibid.  
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D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The Hastily Formed Network (HFN) Research Group at NPS offers an excellent 
model to increase capacity using small academic laboratories. Grants to educational 
centers for the development of HFN-like centers where research can be performed with 
an understanding that the school is required to field a team when called upon. These 
teams would offer ICT surge capacity and offer academic groups the opportunity to 
improve upon field study.  
The HFN Research Group provides field-testing of rapidly deployed emergency 
information and communication solutions. The group provides an academic research 
setting that has practically applications in the field. The location in the Naval 
Postgraduate School has provided the group with important links to the Department of 
Defense and its humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts. They have 
deployed to Katrina, Haiti and most recently to the Philippines during Typhoon Yolanda. 
This group has an impressive track record, participated in numerous disaster response 
exercises, and has built a large body of field data. The teams are structured to rapidly 
deploy, has extensive transportable communication kits, and are expected to be self-
supportive. Field researchers need experience in the implementation of advanced 
information and telecommunication technologies and an ability to work in extreme 
conditions.  
There is an urgent need for these kinds of skills. Funding and grants could be 
made available to academic institutions that have a desire to perform fieldwork and to test 
advanced disaster ICT. Tying funding to deployment requirements would create surge 
capacity. Formation of these groups would require the creation of a variety of guidelines 
and standards that would clearly define operational and technical parameters. These 
groups would serve as an adjunct to response communications needs and develop 








The purpose of this thesis is to discover what critical functions are needed to limit 
the destructive, chaotic phase in catastrophic response. Communications are the key and 
integral function. A primary objective of the thesis is the aggressive restoration and 
vigorous support of a communications system. Crisis responders must develop a 
comprehensive communications strategy. 
The central theme to this thesis is that a catastrophe is primarily an extreme 
disruption of the socio-technical environment. This situation creates a complex, unstable 
nonlinear environment. The chaotic environment is subject to two major forces—
emergent and convergent. The ability of these forces to self-organize, adapt, cooperate, 
and integrate is dependent upon capacity of the communications system.  
This thesis argues that during a response to catastrophic events, the most vital task 
is the reestablishment of a communications system. However, despite acknowledging the 
importance of communications, current U.S. plans and strategy concerning 
communications are insufficient, fragmented, and disorganized. The 2011 National Level 
Exercise, New Madrid earthquake, tested communications inoperability and redundancy 
then moved on to the traditional focus of crisis response practitioners (operations, 
planning, logistics, and to a lesser extent, administration).  
Incident Command System (ICS) is over 40 years old and requires changes to 
support communications efforts adequately. ICS does not provide for a communication 
leader with a voice on the general staff; furthermore, communication and information 
responsibilities are fragmented. A catastrophic event requires intensive ICT efforts. ICS 
does not recognize the synergistic energies of combining these efforts. Finally, the ICS 
model does not acknowledge that information and communications technology (ICT) is a 
highly technical discipline that requires very specific resources, understanding, and 
training within this complex, dynamic, and accelerating field.  
All the official literature acknowledges that communication is a problem during 
crisis response. There is no overall communication strategy that clearly and 
 112 
comprehensively emphasizes the essential nature of reestablishing communication 
networks and managing network evolution and massive information flows that result 
from the intersection of emergent and convergent forces.  
One solution would be to create an information and communication section within 
ICS. This section would be responsible for the implementation of the communications 
strategy. To achieve the goals the section should deploy multiple independent rapid 
technology assessment teams (RTAT). This form of structural distributed management 
system would allow the ICS model to maintain its traditional structure while benefiting 
from an agile open-system strategy in response to ICT needs.  
A crisis response is a highly unstable, social-environmental, nonlinear (chaotic) 
event. The ability to control chaos is limited, but the environment will eventually become 
stable as response blindly and methodically restores the socio-technical networks and 
satisfies the basic needs of the affected population. The goal should be to contract that 
chaotic period, limiting human suffering and economic loss.  
The two most promising methods for controlling chaos are the careful use of 
perturbations and changing the “orbits” within a nonlinear system. Rapid intervention 
using mobile ICT teams is not a new idea.352 The UN and FEMA are both attempting to 
use this concept. During Hurricane Sandy, the FEMA Disaster Emergency 
Communications unit sent out small mobile teams to assess communications needs and 
focus attention of both response resources and private industry to reestablish 
communications.353 This type of ICT intervention uses small perturbations; the teams are 
solely focused on the communication and information needs of the response.  
Establishing network connectivity creates natural social attractors that will allow 
self-organization and adaption of emergent forces and provide a mechanism for 
cooperation and collaboration with convergent forces. By extending the network, the 
natural centers of organization will emerge, and following the properties of preferential 
attachments, they will become hubs or centers for response organization. These hubs, 
                                                 
352 Fritz, and Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters. 
353 Kielty, and MacLean, “We Know You Can Hear Us.”  
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forming many individual basins within the affected region, are examples of orbits of 
attraction. Using the concepts of network sciences and new, inexpensive technologies, 
hubs can now be predicted and promoted, accelerating social linkage.  
The dynamic network maps from Haiti and Katrina demonstrate that the hubs of 
connectivity and centrality change as needs change. The needs of the response do not 
follow a hierarchical model. These changes must be anticipated and addressed before 
traffic (urgent requests for assistance) overwhelms those specific sectors that provide 
particular services and resources. Management is better handled by a unified ICT effort 
that is not simply a support function for the other sections.  
Communications and information management should not be relegated to a 
support of the response effort. It is a crucial, foundational function that impacts every part 
of the response, for better or for worse. As the memories of Hurricane Katrina fade, the 
impetus and urgency for improvement in crisis response wanes. This is a natural cycle 
with respect to policy making. Currently, the national response plans are without a 
coherent and comprehensive communications strategy. There is a failure to appreciate the 
centrality of communications and its role in binding the emergent and convergent forces 
and combatting chaos. Crisis response organization must be changed to acknowledge the 
essential nature of communications formally and place an emphasis on supporting 
communications as a strategic objective. Communications is not a support function, but a 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
 115 
APPENDIX A.  KATRINA NETWORK DATA 
Data sources: 
• Hurricane Katrina network data provided by Louise Comfort of the 
University of Pittsburg—Center for Disaster Management 
• Comfort, Louise K. and Haase, Thomas W. (2006). “Communication, 
Coherence, and Collective Action: The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Infrastructure” (Graduate School of Public and 
International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. Published in Public Works 
Management and Policy, 2006, Vol. 11:1), pp. 1–16. 
• Hurricane Katrina network data provided by Naim Kapucu of the 
University of Central Florida, Department of Public Administration  
• Article written for Administration and Society by Naim Kapucu, Tolga 
Arslan and Matthew Lloyd Collins. (2010). “Examining 
Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response to Catastrophic 
Disasters: Toward a Network-Centered Approach.” 
• Butts, Carter T., Acton, Ryan M., & Marcum, Christopher M. (2012). 
Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response 
(JoSS Vol:13, February 2012), pp. 1–36.  
• Hurricane Katrina data publically available at 
http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume13/katrina_1.0.tar.gz 
A. Data Collection Methods 
Comfort, Louise K. and Haase, Thomas W. (2006). “Communication, Coherence, 
and Collective Action: The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications 
Infrastructure” (Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of 
Pittsburgh. Published in Public Works Management and Policy, 2006, Vol. 11:1), pp. 1–
16. 
Looking for a daily record of actions undertaken to cope with this event, 
we conducted a content analysis of news reported in the Times Picayune, 
the major New Orleans newspaper that continued publication throughout 
the disaster, albeit from Baton Rouge. Through the content analysis, we 
identified all organizations that participated in the response operations to 
Hurricane Katrina and the interactions among them. This set of 
organizations made up a response system of organizations seeking to 
protect lives, protect property, and maintain continuity of operations 
within the affected area. We used these data to characterize the response 
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network and to analyze the relationships among them, using the software 
program, UCINET (Comfort et al., 2006 p. 6). 
Naim Kapucu, Tolga Arslan, and Matthew Lloyd Collins. (2010). “Examining 
Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response to Catastrophic Disasters: Toward a 
Network-Centered Approach.” 
In this study, content analysis of news reports, government documents, 
and after-action reports was conducted. The main goal of the content 
analysis was to find the performance of intergovernmental and 
interorganizational response to the catastrophic disasters in 2005. The 
study uses data from the content analyses of related news reports from the 
New York Times, FEMA National Situation Reports (FEMA, 2006), 
Florida State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Situation Reports 
(www.floridadisaster.org), New Orleans City Situation Reports, Louisiana 
State Situation Reports, Mississippi State Situational Reports, The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Townsend, 2006), 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (U.S. Senate, 2006), and 
the U.S. House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Katrina: A Failure of 
Initiative (2006). 
Network analysis was performed using the UCINET social network 
analysis program to assess the relationships among the organizations that 
responded to the catastrophic disasters. UCINET is a comprehensive 
software program for the analysis of social networks. (Kapucu et al., 2010, 
p. 231). 
Butts, Carter T., Acton, Ryan M., and Marcum, Christopher M. (2012). 
“Interorganizational Collaboration in the Hurricane Katrina Response” (JoSS Vol:13, 
February 2012), pp. 1–36.  
The authors collected materials for this project by searching online sources 
for documents related to the Hurricane Katrina response. Sources were 
identified by multiple methods, including: use of commercial search 
engines (e.g., Google); direct browsing of state, local, and federal websites 
(as well as sites of other organizations identified as potential responders); 
references to websites in online discussion groups, mailing lists, or web-
based information portals; and suggestions from practitioners in the 




B. Hurricane Katrina Metrics 
Participating Organizations 












International 8.3 3.7 ------- 
Federal 17.1 31.4 9 
Regional 2.9 6.2 ------- 
Interstate 1.3 ------- ------- 
State 38 17 27 
Sub-Regional ------ 6.2 ------- 
County 10 13.6 23
Local 15.7 21.9 11 
City 5.7 ------- ------- 
Non-Profit ------- ------- 14 
Private ------- ------- 16 
Total 
Percentage 100354 100 100 
Numbers of 
Organizations 1577 535 580 
 
  
                                                 
354 Butt et al. (2012), p, 8. Addition of 1.1 percent of data missing jurisdictional equals 100 percent.   
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Degree Centrality 
Butts, Acton and Marcum 
(2012)  
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Closeness Centrality Measures 
Butts, Acton and Marcum 
(2012)  
Closeness Centrality Closeness nCloseness 
M 35.911 2.279 
SD 54.256 3.443 
Sum 56632.098 3593.407 
Variance 2943.752 11.852 
SSQ 6676027.500 26878.541 
MCSSQ 4642296.500 18690.479 
Euc Norm 2583.801 163.947 
Min 0.000 0.000 
Max 212.283 13.470 
 
Kapucu, Arslan and 
Collins (2010) 
Closeness Centrality inFarness outFarness inCloseness outCloseness 
M 315959.656 3159595.656 0.185 0.192 
SD 22,697.51 52,856.90 0.013 0.05 
Sum 183,572,560.00 183,572,560.00 107.213 111.494 
Variance 515,177,120.00 2,793,851,648.00 0.000 0.002 
SSQ 58,300,838,182,912.00 59,624,745,074,688.00 19.889 22.837 
MCSSQ 299,317,919,744.00 1,623,227,760,640.00 0.105 1.441 
Euc Norm 7,635,498.50 7,721,706.00 4.460 4.779 
Min 289,673.00 175,273.00 0.172 0.172 




Comfort & Haase (2006) 
Closeness Centrality Farness nCloseness 
 
M 26864.047 1.301  
SD 19760.900 0.504  
Sum 6742876.000 326.587  
Variance 390493184.000 0.254  
SSQ 279154720768.000 488.647  
MCSSQ 98013790208.000 63.711  
Euc Norm 528350.938 22.105  
Min 15493.000 0.400  
Max 62500.000 1.614  




Butts, Acton and Marcum 
(2012)  
Betweenness Centrality Betweenness nBetweenness 
M 319.286 0.026 
SD 2488.452 0.201 
SUM 503514.000 40.570 
Variance 6192392.000 0.040 
SSQ 9926167552.000 64.442 
MCSSQ 9765402624.000 63.398 
Euc Norm 99630.156 8.028 
Min 0.000 0.000






Comfort & Haase (2006) 
Betweenness Centrality Betweenness nBetweenness
M 205.430 0.660 
SD 739.320 2.375 
SUM 51562.000 165.664
Variance 546594.438 5.642 
SSQ 147787808.000 1525.527 
MCSSQ 137195200.000 1416.186 
Euc Norm 12156.801 39.058 
Min 0.000 0.000 
Max 8065.853 25.914 




Kapucu, Arslan and Collins 
(2010)  















KATRINA: 8/24/2005 KATRINA: 8/25/2005 
KATRINA: 8/26/2005 KATRINA: 8/27/2005 
C. Dynamic Network Maps August 24 to September 5, 2005 
Generated form the Butts, Acton, and Marcum data. 
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KATRINA: 8/28/2005/2005 KATRINA: 8/29/2005 




KATRINA: 9/1/2005 KATRINA: 9/2/2005 
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D. Aggregate Maps 
 
 
Figure 1 Hurricane Katrina Network of interacting Organizations, August 27–





Figure 2 Interorganizational networks in response to Hurricane Katrina and 
Rita (Kapucu et al., 2010, p. 234) 
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E. Organization Names 
Legend of Organizations from Comfort and Hasse (2006 p. 13) 
 





















































Arthur Monday Senior Citizens
Center
America’s New Orleans Fund, Inc.
Assumption Parish Police
Department
Archdiocese of New Orleans
Aramark
United States Army
Army Corps of Engineers
Houston Astrodome




Boh Bros. Construction Co.
Baton Rouge Department of Public
Works
Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport
Baton Rouge Police Department












Department of Transportation and
Development, Louisiana




Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries, Louisiana
East Baton Rouge Parish Fire
Department
E.J. Morris Senior Center
























































City of Jean Lafitte
City of Kenner
Cleco Corp
Clarence M. Kelly & Associates
City of New Orleans

















Department of Education, United
States
Department of Health and Hospitals,
Louisiana
Department of Health and Human
Services, United States
Department of Homeland Security,
United States
Diocese of Baton Rouge
DMJM Harris-AECOM
Department of Natural Resources,
Louisiana
Department of Defense, United
States
Department of Justice, Louisiana
Department of Justice, United States
Department of Public Safety and
Corrections, Louisiana
Drug Enforcement Agency, United
States
Governor of Mississippi






Government of Saudi Arabia
St. Bernard Parish
St. Charles Parish
City of St. Gabriel
St. John Parish






























































East Baton Rouge Parish
City of Grand Isle






Department of Transportation and
Development, Louisiana
Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office











Local Hospitals, Medical Care
Local Media











Louisiana State University School of
Journalism
Louisiana State University, Manship







Mayor of Las Vegas
Marrero Marrero-Estelle Fire Station
Mayor of New Orleans
Motorola, Inc
Mayor of Slidell
Office of the President of the United
States























































Hibernia National Bank Operation
Center Houston
Hibernia National Bank Operation
Center Shreveport
Historic New Orleans Collection
Harrah’s New Orleans Casino
Harahan Police Department




Joint Legislative Committee on
Insurance
Jefferson Parish Correctional Center
Jefferson Parish Clerk of Courts







National Association of the
Advancement of Colored People




National Bond Lawyers Association
National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children
National Disaster Medical System
National Football League
National Hurricane Center
New Orleans City Attorney Office
New Orleans Fire Department
New Orleans Finance Department
New Orleans Hornets
New Orleans Museum of Art
New Orleans Mission
New Orleans Police Department
New Orleans Sewerage & Water Board
North Shore Square Mall
Office of Former President Bush





Orleans Parish Civil District Court
Orleans Parish Prison
Public Affairs Office, Slidell
United States Public Health Service
Times-Picayune
St. Rita’s Nursing Home
Social Security Administration
Stennis Space Center


















































St. Bernard Parish Fire Department
St. Bernard Parish Sheriff Office
Southern Baptist Volunteers
Shelter in Corpus Christi Texas
Superdome Commission




The Shaw Group, Inc
Gulf Royal Dutch Shell, PLC

































St. Tammany Parish Council
St. Tammany Parish Emergency
Operations Center
St. Tammany Parish Office of
Emergency Preparedness
St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office
New Orleans Saints
St. Ville Elementary Library








University of Southern Mississippi
Tulane University
Urban League
United States House of
Representatives
United States Senate
United States Secret Service








W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Co.
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APPENDIX B.  HAITI NETWORK DATA 
Dynamic Network Analysis—Earthquake Haiti 
 
Analysis of the Haiti response network uses studies conducted by the University 
of Pittsburgh—Center for Disaster Management. The analysis of the Haiti networks relies 
on the statics generated by the studies. The studies are: 
Group A 
• Comfort, Louise K., Siciliano, Michael D., and Okada, Aya (2011b) 
Resilience, Entropy, and Efficiency in Crisis Management: The January 
12, 2010, Haiti Earthquake” 
• Comfort, Louise K., Siciliano, Michael D., and Okada, Aya (2012) 
Evolving Systems in Crisis Management: The January 12, 2010, Haiti 
Earthquake” 
• Comfort, Louise K. and Okada, Aya (2013). “Emergent Leadership in 
Extreme Events: A Knowledge Commons for Sustainable Communities” 
Group B 
• Scheinert, Steve and Konstantinova, Ralitsa (2011). “Attempting a 
Knowledge Commons in the Field: the Response to the January 12th, 2010 
Haitian Earthquake”  
• Siciliano, Michael (2011). “The Use of Exponential Random Graph 
Models to Investigate the Micro-Level Processes of Inter- Organizational 
Network Formation”  
The dynamic network map were generated for the working paper appendices by 
Scheinert and Konstantinova for the University of Pittsburg—Center for Disaster 
Management: 
• Attempting a Knowledge Commons in the Field: the Response to the 
January 12th, 2010 Haitian Earthquake: Appendices 
The following is the methodology used by Scheinert and Konstantinova for data 






Regularly published during a disaster response, the reports stored on ReliefWeb 
and OneResponse355 document the response as it actually occurred. In presenting the 
cluster system, OneResponse presents how the response is supposed to operate. That is, 
each cluster has a lead organization that coordinates the actions of the cluster’s 
membership, and UNOCHA provides organization, oversight, and coordination between 
the clusters. Cluster Meetings and documents record and communicate organizational and 
cluster actions to provide for real-time or near real- time communication and coordination 
between organizations. In actual performance, however, the response network may form 
and operate in ways that are very different from the plans. The representatives of a 
planned central agency may be unavailable at a key moment, allowing another 
organization to take over those duties, or coordination may collapse over clashes of 
personalities, are examples of two of many possible developments that change the 
system. The task of analyzing the response relies heavily on identifying what form the 
response actually took in practice. This allows the researcher to find and document 
strengths and weaknesses in the response by charting patterns of communication, 
coordination, and interaction. These data can be found in the documents on ReliefWeb 
and OneResponse, so that these documents allow an empirical analysis of the response. 
The Center for Disaster Management (CDM) downloaded 139 situation reports 
(“sitreps”) from ReliefWeb. Each situation was published by one of eleven different 
organizations. In its own sitreps, each organization focuses primarily on its own actions 
and observations, though few are entirely limited to the actions of the publishing 
organization. Nevertheless, due to that self- focus, building a responsibly accurate model 
of the response requires data from more than one organization. The CDM chose the set of 
organizations from experience in researching prior disasters, the official structure of the 
cluster system, and the local international organizations which focus on the Caribbean 
region, where Haiti is located. This list of organizations is: 
 
                                                 
355 ReliefWeb and OneResponse are the largest portals for humanitarian information sharing. The 
portal is administered by UN OCHA. 
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• Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA)  
• UN Health Cluster  
• UN Logistics Cluster  
• United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)  
• UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)  
• Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO)356  
• United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)  
• United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)  
• Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID  
• UN Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster  
• World Food Program (WFP) 
Covering health and sanitation, logistics, food, vulnerable populations, security, 
and large-scale general aid operations, this list of organizations covers the primary aid 
tasks as well as the largest organizations. As mentioned above, the data collected covers 
the first three weeks following the earthquake, specifically 12 January 2010—1 February 
2010, since this is the typical period of initial response before that response changes into 
long-term recovery (Comfort et al., 2011a, Comfort, 1999). This set of data, even with 
the self-focus of each organization’s sitreps, covers the key organizations and structures 
of the response network. 
To ensure the accuracy and validity of this data, CDM researchers, in conjunction 
with geologists from Vassar College and public health researchers from the University of 
Pittsburgh’s School of Public Health, traveled to Haiti, following the earthquake, to 
observe the response directly. This trip took place from 2 May 2010 to 9 May 2010 and 
documented many aspects of the response and recovery efforts (Comfort et al., 2011a). 
The data collected on that trip will augment and extend the analysis from the network 
data collected from the sitreps. 
 
 
                                                 
356 PAHO is also the local division of the World Health Organization. Most actions by either PAHO 
or WHO were reported as having been done by PAHO/WHO or WHO/PAHO. 
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Methods of Analysis 
Primary analysis was conducted by building and analyzing network models of the 
response system that developed during the first three weeks following the earthquake. By 
reviewing the text of the situation reports, they revealed what organizations did and 
which organizations interacted with which other organizations, and which worked alone. 
CDM researchers built the network models by recording these dyads and monads, 
observed in the sitreps discussed above, and then processing the dyads and monads 
through network analysis software357
 
to reveal the patterns of action and interaction 
following the earthquake. CDM researchers made two versions of this network. The first 
was a static network that combined all the interactions observed in all of the sitreps into a 
single network for analysis. The second was a set of dynamic networks. 
This set took each day during the first three weeks as a separate network, only 
coding for each day the dyads and monads that the researchers observed in the sitreps 
published on that day. This method shows the changes in the network over the course of 
the response. It shows how the network initially grew and developed. 
With the network models made, network analysis includes several measures of the 
pattern of connections in the model that can be used to describe the model. Centrality 
measures can be used to determine the most well connected nodes, and so the most 
important nodes, in the network. Network centralization measures, including clustering 
coefficients, average distance, and network density describe the shape and amount of 
possible connections in the network that are actually observed. As a mirror to that, isolate 
counts record how many nodes are observed in the network but which lack any 
connections to any other nodes and network fragmentation records how many separate 
pieces there are in the network that are connected within that piece, but not to other 
pieces (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Taking these measurements to describe the shape 
and characteristics of the network will show any gaps in the response system (Scheinert 
and Konstantinova, 2011 pp. 4–6). 
                                                 
357 This paper uses two pieces of software at different times: *ORA, programmed at the CASOS 
Institute, at Carnegie Mellon University (Carley, 2011), is used for primary construction of the networks 
and taking dynamic measures. Most of the maps presented in this paper are made using NetDraw, which is 
the visualizer for UCINet, which is published by Analytic Technologies (Borgatti et al., 2002).  
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APPENDIX C.  GLOSSARY OF NETWORK TERMS 
Bridge: the individual node that is the sole connection between clusters or nodes 
within the network. Bridges are often identified by their high betweenness value. 
Betweenness: The number of times a node acts as a bridge along the shortest path 
between two nodes. The node with high betweenness values have larger influence in the 
sharing of information in a network. This assumes that that information sharing follows 
the shortest path concept. 
Centrality measures can be used to determine the most well connected nodes, and 
so the most important (or influential) nodes, in a network. It is explained using a variety 
of  
• Degree Centrality: Number of links a node possesses. 
• Closeness Centrality: the distance between all pairs of nodes, defined by 
the length of the shortest path. 
• Betweenness Centrality: defines the frequency a specific node acts as a 
bridge via the shortest path between two other nodes. This measure can 
define network resilience. 
• Eigenvector Centrality: is the measure of closeness, a nodes influence 
within a network. The measure identifies the more central node within the 
overall network as opposed to those nodes that are highly connected 
within sub-clusters.  
Closeness: Nodes that have the overall shortest paths between other nodes in a 
network. 
Cluster: a cluster is a collection of actors with dense linkage patterns internally 
and sparse links externally. 
Component: The component to which a node belongs is that set of nodes that can 
be reached from it by paths running along edges of the graph. In a directed graph a node 
has both an in-component and an out-component, which are the sets of nodes from which 
the node can be reached and which can be reached from it. 
Degree: The number of edges connected to a node. Note that the degree is not 
necessarily equal to the number of nodes adjacent to a node, since there may be more 
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than one edge between any two nodes. In a few recent articles, the degree is referred to as 
the “connectivity” of a node, but we avoid this usage because the word connectivity 
already has another meaning in graph theory. A directed graph has both an in-degree and 
an out-degree for each vertex, which are the numbers of in-coming and out-going edges 
respectively. The average degree is the average number of ties that each node has and is a 
measure of density.  
Density: is a ratio of edges to the possible number of edges within a network. It 
defines the degree of connectivity within a network. Range 0–1.0 
Diameter: The diameter of a network is the length (in number of edges) of the 
longest geodesic path between any two vertices. A few authors have also used this term 
to mean the average geodesic distance in a graph, although strictly the two quantities are 
quite distinct. 
Directed/undirected: An edge is directed if it runs in only one direction (such as a 
one-way road between two points), and undirected if it runs in both directions. Directed 
edges, which are sometimes called arcs, can be thought of as sporting arrows indicating 
their orientation. A graph is directed if all of its edges are directed. An undirected graph 
can be represented by a directed one having two edges between each pair of connected 
vertices, one in each direction. 
Edge: The line connecting two vertices. Also called a bond (physics), a link 
(computer science), or a tie (sociology). 
Fragmentation: The proportion of all pairs of nodes that are not tied with one 
another. 
Geodesic path: A geodesic path is the shortest path through the network from one 
vertex to another. Note that there may be and often is more than one geodesic path 
between two vertices. 
Hub: Highly connected nodes within a network.   
Isolates: Nodes without connection to other nodes within a network. 
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Isolate Counts: record how many nodes are observed in the network but which 
lack any connections to any other nodes and network fragmentation records how many 
separate pieces there are in the network that are connected within that piece, but not to 
other pieces (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
Network centralization measures, including clustering coefficients, average 
distance, and network density describe the shape and amount of possible connections in 
the network that are actually observed. 
Node: The fundamental unit of a network, also called a site (physics), a node 
(computer science), or an actor (sociology) or a vertice. 
ORA: Widely used network analysis software. 
Path Distance: a method to calculate distance form nodes to all others (“far-
ness”). This is the sum of the distance of each node to all others within the network. The 
average path length is calculated by adding the shortest path between all nodes and 
dividing by the total number of pairs. 
Path Length: The total number of edges (ties) in a path from one node (actor) to 
another. 
Size: refers to either the number of nodes or edges within a network. 
Social Network: A social structure made up of social actors and a set of links 
(edges) between the actors signifying some definition of social relation. 
Sub-group: measures that allow network partitioning. A component is parts of a 
network with all actors are connected. The nodes can be directly or indirectly linked by at 
least one tie. By definition, each isolate is a separate component. A giant component is 
the largest sub-group within a network. 
Weighted Network: In an unweighted network all links and nodes are treated as 
the same. A weighted network adds dimension to the network topology by assigning a 
value to attributes such as capacity, influence, frequency. 
UCINET is a comprehensive software program for the analysis of social 
networks. The program contains several network analytic routines (e.g., centrality 
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measures, dyadic cohesion measures, positional analysis algorithms, and clique), and 
general statistical and multivariate analysis tools such as multidimensional scaling, 
correspondence analysis, factor analysis, cluster analysis, and multiple regression 
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APPENDIX E.  NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK ANNEXES 
AND INCIDENT COMMAND STRUCTURES 2004, 2008 & 2013. 
The National Response Plan—2004 
1. Emergency Support Functions 
2. NRP ESF #2—Communications (Introduction and Scope) 
3. NRP ESF #5—Emergency Management (Introduction and Scope) 
4. ESF Coordinator and Primary and Support Agencies 
5. NRP Incident Management Structure 
The National Response Framework—2008 
1. Emergency Support Functions 
2. NRP ESF #2—Communications (Introduction and Scope) 
3. NRP ESF #5—Emergency Management (Introduction and Scope) 
4. NRP Incident Management Structure 
The National Response Framework—2013 
1. Emergency Support Functions 
2. NRP ESF #2—Communications (Introduction and Scope) 
3. NRP ESF #5—Emergency Management (Introduction and Scope) 
4. NRP Incident Management Structure 


















Emergency Support Function (ESF) #2—Communications ensures the provision 
of Federal telecommunications support to Federal, State, and local response efforts 
following a presidentially declared major disaster, emergency, or extraordinary situation 
under the Federal Response Plan (FRP). This ESF supplements the provisions of the 
National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies, hereafter 
referred to as the National Telecommunications Support Plan (NTSP). 
B. Scope 
ESF #2 coordinates Federal actions to be taken to provide the required national 
security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications support to Federal, 
State, and local disaster response elements. This ESF will coordinate the establishment of 
required temporary NS/EP telecommunications and the restoration of permanent 
telecommunications. Where appropriate, services may be furnished under provisions of 
the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) system. ESF #2 applies to all Federal 
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departments and agencies that may require telecommunications services or whose 




December 2004 ESF Annexes Introduction ESF-v 
 National Response Plan  
Figure 2.  Designation of ESF coordinator and primary and support agencies 
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































USDA   S  S S  S  S C/P S  P S 
USDA/FS S S S C/P S S S S S S   S   
DOC S S S S S  S  S S S S S P/S S 
DOD S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S 
DOD/USACE   C/P S S S  S S S S S S S  
ED     S          S 
DOE S  S  S  S S  S S C/P S S S 
HHS   S  S S  C/P S S S   P/S S 
DHS S S S  S S S S S S S S C/P/S S C 
DHS/EPR/FEMA  S P S C/P C/P   C/P S    C/P P 
DHS/IAIP/NCS  C/P          S    
DHS/USCG S  S S    S S P   S   
HUD     S S        P S 
DOI S S S S S S    S P S S S S 
DOJ S    S S  S S S S  C/P/S  S 
DOL   S  S S S S S S S S  S S 
 
C = ESF coordinator  
P = Primary agency  
S = Support agency 
 
Note:  Unless a specific component of a department or agency is the ESF coordinator or a primary agency, it is not listed in this chart.  Refer to the ESF 
Annexes for detailed support by each of these departments and agencies. 
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ESF-vi ESF Annexes Introduction December 2004 
  National Response Plan  
Figure 2.  Designation of ESF coordinator and primary and support agencies (Continued) 
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DOS S    S   S  S S S   S 
DOT C/P  S  S S S S S S S S  S S 
TREAS     S S        P S 
VA   S  S S S S     S  S 
EPA   S S S   S  C/P S S S S S 
FCC  S   S          S 
GSA S S S  S S C/P S  S S    S 
NASA     S  S  S    S  S 
NRC   S  S     S  S   S 
OPM     S  S        S 
SBA     S S        P S 
SSA      S       S  S 
TVA   S  S       S  S S 
USAID        S S      S 
USPS S    S S  S   S  S  S 
ARC   S  S P  S   S   S S 
 
C = ESF coordinator  
P = Primary agency  
S = Support agency 
 
Note:  Unless a specific component of a department or agency is the ESF coordinator or a primary agency, it is not listed in this chart.  Refer to the ESF 
Annexes for detailed support by each of these departments and agencies. 
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Source—FEMA Sample Incident Command System (ICS) Organization Chart, 
accessed 9/9/2014, training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/assets/icsorganization.pdf 
Command Staff: The Command Staff consists of the Public Information Officer, 
Safety Officer, and Liaison Officer. They report directly to the Incident Commander.  
Section: The organization level having functional responsibility for primary 
segments of incident management (Operations, Planning, Logistics, 
Finance/Administration). The Section level is organizationally between Branch and 
Incident Commander.  
Branch: That organizational level having functional, geographical, or 
jurisdictional responsibility for major parts of the incident operations. The Branch level is 
organizationally between Section and Division/Group in the Operations Section, and 
between Section and Units in the Logistics Section. Branches are identified by the use of 
Roman Numerals, by function, or by jurisdictional name.  
Division: That organizational level having responsibility for operations within a 
defined geographic area. The Division level is organizationally between the Strike Team 
and the Branch.  
Group: Groups are established to divide the incident into functional areas of 
operation. Groups are located between Branches (when activated) and Resources in the 
Operations Section.  
Unit: That organization element having functional responsibility for a specific 
incident planning, logistics, or finance/administration activity.  
Task Force: A group of resources with common communications and a leader 
that may be pre- established and sent to an incident, or formed at an incident.  
Strike Team: Specified combinations of the same kind and type of resources, 
with common communications and a leader.  
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Single Resource: An individual piece of equipment and its personnel 
complement, or an established crew or team of individuals with an identified work 
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